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Abstract
This paper analyzes the role of newborn gender in households’ investment decisions.
The results indicate that newborn gender is a significant predictor of both the real-
location of financial wealth across different types of financial assets and households’
investment diversification. Parenting a new baby boy is associated with a higher real-
location of wealth towards cash while the share of financial wealth allocated to risky
assets decreases. A new baby boy also significantly reduces the magnitude of portfo-
lio diversification. We find no evidence that the relationship between newborn gender
and investment allocation is driven by third variables that simultaneously affect gender
and financial decisions. The relationship between newborn gender and the financial
decision is particularly relevant to disentangle unconscious gender bias in households’
investment decisions.
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1. Introduction
Gender bias affects several aspects of life. Gender-biased hiring has been alleged for many
occupations. In symphony orchestras, the blind audition procedure fostered impartiality
in hiring and increased the proportion of women in orchestras (Goldin and Rouse, 2000).
Gender bias extend to compensation (Price, 2012). Although women participation in the top
executive ranks recently increased, their relative compensation did not increase accordingly
and female top managers still face a pay gap in listed companies (Bertrand and Hallock,
2001). In fact, the gender pay gap includes, but it is not limited to, lawyers, university
faculty, engineers and physicians (Wood, Corcoran, and Courant, 1993; Baker, 1996; Morgan,
1998; Gander, 1997).
Financial industry is not an exception. The 2018 report for the 2020WOB shows that
half of the companies in the Russell 3000 Index have one or no women on their boards.1
Venture capital firms hire few female partners although greater gender diversity improves
deal and fund performances (Gompers and Wang, 2017a,b). Similar evidence has been found
in the mutual fund industry where female managers receive fewer fund and are less likely to
be promoted than male fund managers (Barber, Scherbina, and Schlusche, 2017; Niessen-
Ruenzi and Ruenzi, 2018).
Gender biases also influence household’s behaviour. In disadvantaged families, fathers
of sons support their families more than fathers of daughters (Garcia, Heckmanb, and Ziff,
2018). A first-born son is significantly more likely to be living with his father compared to
a first-born daughter; the evidence supports the explanation that parents favour boys over
girls (Dahl and Moretti, 2008). In addition, parents exhibit systematic biases when forced
to choose between spending on sons and daughters. Mothers consistently favor daughters,
whereas fathers, who are usually the higher income earners and responsible for families’
investment decisions, consistently favor sons (Nikiforidis, Durante, Redden, and Griskevicius,
2018).
1https://www.2020wob.com/sites/default/files/2020WOB_GDI_Report_2018_FINAL.pdf
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In this paper we ask whether gender biases influence household’s investment choices. In
particular, we examine how newborn gender relates to the share of financial wealth held in
several asset categories and to overall portfolio diversification. The answer has implications
for understanding how household’s beliefs influence the use of financial instruments to achieve
household’s objectives and for determining the optimal regulatory response, if any.
We use data from the Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW), conducted by
the Bank of Italy every two years, which is the main source of information on the financial
behaviour of Italian households at the micro level (Iezzi, 2008), and take advantage of the
birth of a child as a natural experiment to analyze the impact of gender bias on household’s
investment choices. One may claim that the decision to have a child is not entirely exoge-
nous, thus there may be unobserved variables that affect both such decision and investment
allocation. While this may be true for the decision to have a child, it does not necessarily
hold for the actual parenthood. When we examine the average effect of a newborn, regardless
of the gender, on investment allocation, consistently with standard asset allocation models
we find that having a child reduces the share of financial wealth held in liquidity, such as
cash, and increases the share allocated to longer term investments, like risky assets.
Since the gender of the newborn is undoubtedly exogenous, we are able to address possible
endogeneity concerns and to offer causal evidence on the effect that having a baby boy rather
than a baby girl in the household produces on investment choices. When considering financial
decisions in terms of fraction of wealth held in each asset, we find that having baby girls
significantly reduces the share of liquid assets represented by cash while this effect is halved
when the new baby is a boy. The additional financial wealth moved away from cash when
the newborn is a girl is used to increase the share of retirement benefits and risky assets. In
particular, the share of financial wealth invested in risky assets significantly increases when
the newborn is a girl but this effect is fully offset by a boy. When looking at portfolio choice
in terms of overall diversification, we find that households having a baby boy diversify less
their portfolio as compared to households having a baby girl. Finally, when considering the
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birth order effect, we find that the evidence of an effect of newborn gender on household’s
decision to allocate their wealth among the several asset categories is driven by firstborn
children, while for overall portfolio diversification, despite the heterogeneity is bigger for
firstborn children, there is also evidence of a gender effect for other children.
Our evidence points to the existence of a gender bias in household’s investment decisions.
To interpret our findings, we follow a framework based on Glynn and Sen (2015). Personal
relationships (e.g., having daughters) could play a key role in affecting decision making.
Protectionism theory suggests that people want to protect those with whom they have strong
personal relationships. Under this theory, parenting a daughter results in protecting her
from possible gender-based discrimination, predators, and reinforcing connections between
the daughters and the family. In this respect, a long literature has documented parental
differential treatment of daughters and sons (Sidorowicz and Sparks, 1980; Raley and Bianchi,
2006; Condry, McConnell, Jr., and Pogatshnik, 1983). In line with this literature, parents
are more likely to actively manage their wealth if the newborn is a girl rather than a boy,
having the final goal to protect daughters by providing them with larger financial assets in
the future. As a consequence, having a daughter increases the probability that households
invest in long term securities and increases portfolio diversification.
An alternative interpretation, which however leads to a similar conclusion, is related to
gender discrimination in patriarchal societies (Kaul, 2018). In societies where the norm is to
not expect future support from daughters, parents having baby girls may invest more in long
term securities to support themselves when they grow old. Under such interpretation, the
birth of a baby boy has a lower impact on household finance because parents promote boys’
autonomy and financial independence so that sons can assume responsibility for parents’
welfare in their old age. Households selectively allocate resources to children in response to
variation in gender differences in their expected earnings opportunities as adults (Rosenzweig
and Schultz, 1982).
Our results are robust when controlling for household composition, geographical prove-
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nance, education and financial education, income and attitudes; when excluding singletons;
when taking into account the sovereign debt crisis which affected Italy in 2011; when allow-
ing the error terms of the different models to correlate, and when considering the decision
to invest in each of the various asset classes as dependent variable.
This study sheds a light on the importance of policy interventions that aim to reach
gender equality and to foster households’ financial choices more consistent with standard
allocation models. Our results suggest that the genuine removal of a bias or change in belief
within households can help reaching this goal.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the related liter-
ature. Section 3 describes the data and methodology. Sections 4 presents the main results
and includes a range of robustness tests. Section 5 compares firstborn and other children.
Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2. Related literature
Our paper is related to two strands of literature. First, in the economic literature that
investigates households finance, a recurrent theme is the ability of households to follow
the optimal behaviour predicted by normative models. In fact, empirical analyses of the
investment behaviour of households indicate that observed choices are often inconsistent with
standard asset allocation models. The greatest failure is perhaps the fact that the majority
of individuals do not hold fully diversified portfolios (Haliassos and Hassapis, 2002). Many
explanations have been proposed, relating investment choice to risk aversion and investment
opportunities, to resources available to the household (total wealth and income) as well as
to demographic characteristics (age, race, gender, marital status) of household’s members
(Gollier, 2002; Rosen and Wu, 2004; Carroll, 2002).
In a comprehensive review, Guiso and Sodini (2012) show the heterogeneity of households’
behaviour, even when confronted with the same decision problem. This evidence opens
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up the debate of whether household’s sub optimal choices are the result of mistakes or
systematic behavioural biases. Recent findings support the first view: more sophisticated
(especially more educated and richer) households seem to behave closer to the prescriptions
of normative models (Calvet, Campbell, and Sodini, 2007). We provide evidence in support
of the behavioural biases view by documenting that households make financial decisions
under the influence of gender bias. Furthermore, since gender bias works toward a lower
allocation of wealth to risky assets, our findings may represent an additional explanation for
households’ low level of stock market participation.
Secondly, this paper is related to the recent literature which has demonstrated the im-
portance of the family environment for an individual’s behaviour. Some emerging work has
shown that parents’ decision making process can be influenced by the gender of their children
in politics, business and in the legal courts. Congressperson’s propensity to vote liberally,
particularly on reproductive rights issues, increases when parenting daughters (Washington,
2008). In business, companies’ investment policies change when the CEO has a daughter
(Cronqvist and Yu, 2017; Gompers and Wang, 2017a). Judges with daughters consistently
vote on gender issues supporting women’s rights more than judges who have only sons
(Glynn and Sen, 2015). In line with this literature, we investigate whether biases related
to the gender of children affect households’ investment choices, particularly those which are
inconsistent with standard allocation models.
We focus on Italy for several motives. The size of the industry is relevant. At the end
of 2016, according to the Bank of Italy’s SHIW and to the Federal Reserve’s Survey of
Consumer Finances, the mean net worth of Italian families amounted to e125.8 thousand
compared to $97.3 thousand of US families. The average income of Italian households is,
however, e30.7 thousand, compared to $102.7 thousand of American households.
Italy and the US are also quite similar as for gender equality. In 2013, the IMF gender
development index scored 0.97 in Italy, slightly below the value of 1 of the US, whereas the
IMF gender inequality index was lower in Italy (0.06) than in the US (0.28), suggesting that
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Italian women face lower inequalities relative to US women.
Nevertheless, Italian households bear some specificities which derive from the cultural,
economic and legal environment in which their investment decisions are taken (Guiso and
Sodini, 2012). They invest a larger share of wealth in illiquid assets, typically real estate and
durables. 69 per cent of Italian households own their primary residence as compared to 63.7
per cent of American households. Italian households also show a lower participation rate in
financial markets. Only 3.5 per cent of Italian families invest in stocks, as compared to 13.9
per cent of US families. The lower participation rate in financial markets can be partially
explained by Italian households’ low financial sophistication. According to OECD (2017)
Italian households assigning a budget for investment and actually making financial decisions
amount to about 30 per cent compared to more than 50 per cent of American households;
only 27 per cent of Italian households set long term financial goals and strive to achieve them
(57 per cent in the US).
3. Data and Methodology
In this section, we first describe the data set that we use in our analysis reporting summary
statistics of our sample. Then, we detail the methodology used to empirically identify the
effect of newborn gender on household’s portfolio choice.
3.1. Data
We use data from the Survey on Household Income and Wealth (SHIW)2, a nationally
representative survey that has been conducted by the Bank of Italy every 2 years since 1977.
The SHIW provides detailed information on the personal and demographic characteristics of
the individuals of each household (status in household, gender, age, nationality, educational
2The detailed questionnaire, the data and further details regarding the Survey on
Household Income and Wealth are available on the website of the Bank of Italy,
http://www.bancaditalia.it/statistiche/indcamp/bilfait.
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qualifications, marital status and region of residence), on their working activity (employment
status, type of occupation, industry, number of work experiences, type of contract, average
weekly hours of work, earnings and wealth) and, of particular interest for our analysis, on
their total wealth and on the allocation of their wealth expressed as the ownership and the
amount held in a quite comprehensive set of financial assets (e.g bank or postal deposits,
certificates of deposit, T-bills and T-bonds, bonds issued by Italian and foreign firms, money
market funds and ETF, shares in companies and so on). For these reasons, the SHIW
satisfies the characteristics that a high-quality data set on investment strategies should have,
as suggested by Calvet et al. (2007) and Guiso and Sodini (2012).
We consider the panel component of households for which we have observations in four
waves of the SHIW: 2010, 2012, 2014 and 2016. We start from 2010 wave for two main
reasons. First we wish to gather data on households’ on comparable standards. For instance,
before 2008, SHIW does not include data on the cash value of life insurance. Life insurance
is one of the main variable of interest in our analysis, considering the important role of
insurance in household investment and savings decisions, and the size of the Italian life
insurance market (Gormley, Liu, and Zhou, 2010).3 The second reason to start from 2010
is to exclude the global financial crisis as households’ investment choices may be affected by
financial markets losses and by negative personal experiences (Andersen and Nielsen, 2019;
Malmendier and Nagel, 2011).4 We then narrow our sample to households that have a new
baby in the time span 2010-2016 and restrict our analysis to such households observed both
in the wave in which they had the baby and in the previous wave. For example, if one
household has a child with year of birth 2013 or 2014, it is classified as having a new baby
in the wave 2014 and the observation of the household is included in the sample both in the
wave 2014 and 2012.5 We end up with a sample of 163 observations, 104 having a new baby
and 59 corresponding to the same families in the wave before of that of the baby birth. Of
3Gross premium amounted to 6.1 per cent of GDP at the end of 2016 as reported by IVASS (2018).
4In additional test we start from 2012 to eventually exclude the effects of the sovereign debt crisis of 2011.
5Five families had both a baby boy and a girl in the same wave. As this event prevents from disentangling
the gender effect, we drop these observations.
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these, 50 babies were boys and 54 girls.
Following Rosen and Wu (2004) we allocate tangible wealth among seven asset classes.
Physical assets are real and represent ’vehicles’ and ’real estate’ wealth. Six asset classes
are financial and correspond to cash, safe assets, bond, retirement benefits, life insurance
and risky assets. Cash includes bank or postal deposits, such as current accounts, saving
accounts or deposit books. Safe assets contain certificates of deposit, repos, postal savings
certificates and Italian government bonds, such as T-bills, T-certificates and T-bonds. Bond
has categories such as bonds issued by Italian firms and banks, money market funds and
ETF, debt funds and foreign government securities. Retirement benefits include personal
retirement plan or supplementary pension fund; state pension is excluded. Life insurance
contains cash value life insurance but does not include insurance policies that provide a
supplementary pension, such as individual pension plans, which go into retirement benefits.
Risky assets have categories such as stocks, shares of unlisted companies, shares in companies
limited by shares - srl, shares of partnerships, mutual funds or ETF in equities and in
foreign currencies, foreign equities, other foreign securities and other financial assets such as
derivative securities, royalties.
We look at financial decisions under two different points of view, that lead to two sets of
dependent variables. The first looks at the share of total net worth held in each asset, that
we denote as %. First we compute the value of financial assets as the sum of the wealth held
in the above described six financial asset classes, the value of the wealth held in physical
assets and the value of the total net worth as the sum of financial assets’ value and physical
assets’ value. Then we compute the share of financial assets’ value held as cash, safe assets,
bonds, retirement benefits, life insurance, and risky assets on one hand, and the share of
total net worth invested in physical rather than financial assets on the other.
The second view looks at portfolio choice in terms of overall diversification. With this
aim we create two indexes. The first that we call Div Index is inspired by Arnaboldi, Casu,
Kalotychou, and Sarkisyan (2018) and measures the overall degree of portfolio diversification
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capturing the proportion of each asset class that the household holds in her portfolio. For
each wave we have first converted the continuous variables for the value held in each asset
category into discrete variables ranging from 1 to 4 based on the quartile (bottom to top)
of the sample distribution they fall into (quartileac where ac is the asset class). We have
then computed the Div Index for each household as the sum of our seven quartileac asset
classes divided by 28. The second index, Div2 Index, is inspired by Li and Wahid (2018). In
order to calculate it we have used our quartileac variables to compute for each household the
percentage of asset classes held in each quartile (that is the number of asset classes held in
each quartile divided by 7, the total number of asset classes). We have then squared these
figures and summed them up. Finally, we have subtracted the latter value from 1.6
For the sake of simplicity, we have divided our control variables into four main categories.
We select our controls following Guiso and Paiella (2008), Iezzi (2008), and Rosen and Wu
(2004). The first category, households composition, includes: whether the household in the
year of the observation has a new baby and whether the new baby is a boy; the number of
members of the family and the share of women in the household; the number of children; the
age of the head of household, defined as the major income earner, and whether the head of
the household is a woman. The second category includes the region of birth of the member
of the household who answered to the survey and whether the couple is not Italian to check
for geographical provenance. Third we control for education, by including the highest level
of education of household’s members, and their financial education, computed as the first
component of a principal component analysis of three indicators of financial education, that
is whether the household has a credit card, whether she uses the home banking service
and whether she applied to more than one financial intermediary when asking for consumer
credit. In the final category we have income and attitudes, that is the net income of the
household, its squared value, the share of income earners in the household, whether the head
of household is employed, the attitude towards financial risk, and whether the parents of the
6Div2Index = 1−∑4x=1(TotalAssetsInQuartilex/TotalAssets)2
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head of household are alive.7 Definitions of the variables are provided in Appendix 1, and
correlations between the variables used in the analysis are reported in Appendix 2.
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the selected dependent and independent
variables over the sample period.
<Insert Table 1 about here>
Looking at the asset classes, on average 81.3 per cent of households’ total net worth
is invested in real estates and durables. Of the remaining 20 per cent, more than a half
is invested in cash.8 In terms of portfolio diversification, households do not hold greatly
diversified portfolios (diversity indexes equal 38.7 and 32.1 per cent, respectively).
We compute indicators of the decision to invest in each asset class following Brunnermeier
and Nagel (2008), that is we create dummies set to one for households that did not hold at
t-2 and did hold at t wealth in the corresponding financial asset class, zero if the household
does not hold wealth in that asset class in t-2 and t and missing to the observations of the
household belonging to the years after it has invested into the asset class. On average, 73.7
per cent of households invest in cash over the sample period, 12.7 per cent in retirement
benefits, and 11.6 per cent in life insurance.
As for household features, Italian families are on average formed by 3.6 members, almost
evenly balanced by gender and have about 2 children. A new baby is present in almost 64
per cent of the households sample, and the newborn is a boy in the 48 per cent of cases.
Heads of household, defined as the major income earners, are on average almost 39 years old
and less than 14 per cent of them are women.
Thirty one per cent of the sample was born in Northern Italy and foreign couples are
about one-fifth of the sample.
7Section 4.1.3 provides a through discussion of controls.
839 households state to have no financial wealth, some of these households state this for two or three of
the waves that we consider. For this reason, the sum of the shares invested in the six financial asset classes
does not add up to one. If we exclude the observations with zero total wealth invested in financial assets (58),
we find that, on average, households with a positive value of financial assets invest 80.2%, 3.5%, 4.1%, 5.2%,
1.9% and 5.1% in cash, safe assets, bonds, retirement benefits, life insurance and risky assets, respectively.
We take this aspect into account in our robustness tests when we look at the decision to invest in the six
financial asset classes.
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The high school diploma is on average the highest level of education attained by household
members. Financial education, which is a principal component analysis of three indicators
of financial education, that is whether the household has a credit card, whether she uses the
home banking service and whether she applies to more than one financial intermediary when
asking for consumer credit, reports low level on average.
Almost 50 per cent of household members earn an income, which consists, on average,
of about e30,000 per year. The head of the household is usually employed (90 per cent of
the sample) and 87 per cent has parents alive. The average propensity to financial risk is
based on the answer to the question ’In managing your financial investments, would you say
you have a preference for investments that offer:’ and ranges from 0 (if the answer is: ’low
returns, with no risk of losing the invested capital’) to 4 (if the answer is: ’very high returns,
but with a high risk of losing part of the capital’). On average it is close to zero (0.69) and
it scores 3 as maximum value.
3.2. Methodology
We provide causal evidence on the role of having a newborn and his gender on household
portfolio decisions by adopting the following difference-in-difference (DID) approach:
Yit = β0+β1NEWBABY BORNit+β2NEWBABY BORN∗BOYit+β3Xi+β4Tt+β5Cit+it
where Yit is the value of the outcome variable for household i in year t ; NEWBABY BORNit
is a variable indicating whether the household i has a baby in year t ; NEWBABY BORN ∗
BOYit is the interaction variable between the birth of the baby and his gender to test a
differentiated effect of boys and girls; Xi are household fixed effects; Tt are time fixed effects;
Cit is the vector of our control variables; it is an error term assumed to be independently
distributed from our controls.
In all regressions, standard errors are clustered at the household level to allow for flexible
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error correlation structure within households. Our DID approach compares changes in the
outcome variable subsequent to the baby birth in case of a new baby boy or a new baby
girl with changes experienced by households without a newborn during the corresponding
years. With this identification strategy, we aim to separate the effect of newborns from other
factors potentially affecting portfolio choice.
We include household and time fixed effects because our setting involves multiple treat-
ment groups and time periods (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009). Thus, household and time
fixed effects control for fixed differences between treated and control households and for ag-
gregate fluctuations. Treated households are those having a baby while control households
are those without a new baby as of a particular time (Fauver, Hung, Li, and Taboada, 2017;
Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003). Within treated households, we then distinguish between
those having a baby boy and those having a baby girl.
Our parameter of interest is β2. An estimated coefficient significantly different from zero
indicates that the gender of the newborn matters and portfolio choices are different when
the new baby is a boy. β1 represents the effect on our outcome variable of having a new
baby girl while the (linear) combination of the two parameters represents the effect of a new
baby boy on the household portfolio choice. Cit, the vector of our control variables allows
us to mitigate the effect of correlated omitted variable bias.
4. Newborn gender and household’s financial decision
4.1. Shares of assets
In this section we study investment choice by considering changes in the share of financial
wealth invested in six different asset classes, that is cash, safe assets, bond, retirement
benefits, life insurance and risky assets, and in the share of total wealth that the household
decides to invest in physical rather than in financial assets. Before answering our main
research question, that is the role of newborn gender on portfolio choice, we look at the
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effect of having a newborn per se. Thus, we start by estimating a simplified version of our
model and then add our main variable.
4.1.1. Newborn and household investment
In Table 2, we regress on the dummy variable New Baby Born the percentage of financial
wealth held as cash or invested respectively in safe assets, bonds, retirement benefits, life
insurance and risky assets and the percentage of total wealth invested in physical rather than
financial assets. Having a new baby changes household’s composition because it increases
the number of family members. However, such increase may happen also for other reasons,
such as a new partner or a parent/relative moving into the family. In order to separate
the birth of a new baby from such confounding effect, in all the specifications we control
for the number of family members (No. FAMILY MEMBERS ) which may impact portfolio
allocation because of different preferences within households (Browning, 2000).
<Insert Table 2 about here>
We find that having a new baby significantly reduces the percentage of financial wealth
held as cash by 0.28 and instead increases the percentage invested in risky assets by 0.06.
Results point also to an increase in the share invested in retirement benefits although the
effect is not significant at conventional levels (p-value=0.125). An effect similar in magnitude
to the latter but less precisely estimated emerges for the share invested in safe assets and in
bonds while the coefficient of life insurance is close to zero. Having a baby usually changes
parents’ planning horizons. Our finding is consistent with the view that households with
longer planning horizons tend to devote a smaller share of their portfolios to cash and a
larger share in other types of assets with longer holding period (Rosen and Wu, 2004).
The number of family members has a significantly positive effect on the percentage of
financial wealth held as cash: a new member in the family, like for instance a partner or a
relative moving in, increases the wealth held as cash by 0.2.
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4.1.2. Newborn gender and household investment
Investigating the role of having a new child per se on household’s investment allocation,
despite being relevant from a policy perspective, may have two limitations. First, one may
claim that the decision to have a child is not entirely exogenous, thus there may be unobserved
variables that affect both such decision and investment allocation. While this may be true for
the decision to have a child, it does not necessarily hold for the actual parenthood. Second,
household’s decisions may vary depending on the newborn gender. Thus, looking at the
average effect may mask important gender specific evidence. This is the reason why our main
research interest lies on the role that newborn gender plays in shaping household investment
choice. Gender is undoubtedly exogenous thus, thanks to this and to our differences-in-
differences analysis, we are able to offer causal evidence on the effect that having a baby boy
rather than a baby girl in the household produces on investment choices.
In Table 3 we investigate the role of newborn gender by adding to the previous speci-
fication the interaction variable between our dummy NEW BABY BORN and the dummy
BOY that takes the value of 1 if the baby is a boy and 0 otherwise. Besides changing the
number of components, the birth of a new baby also changes the gender composition of the
household. This change as well may happen for different reasons thus to control for changes
in the gender composition of the family not related to the gender of the newborn, we also
include among controls the fraction of women in the household (% FEMALES ).9
<Insert Table 3 about here>
We find that indeed households’ decision on how to allocate their wealth among financial
assets when a new baby enters in the family is influenced by the gender of the newborn.
Baby girls significantly reduce the share of liquid assets represented by cash by 0.36 while
this effect is halved when the new baby is a boy (the interaction has p-value=0.162 while the
final effect for a boy is -0.188, p-value=0.082). The additional financial wealth moved away
9According to ISTAT (2017), in Italy the life expectancy at birth is 84.9 years for women and 80.6 years
for men. Women are more likely to live longer than their husband.
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from cash when the newborn is a girl is used to increase the share of retirement benefits
and of risky assets. The decision to move wealth away from cash in favour of longer term
investments in case of a new baby girl is not taken when the new baby is a boy. In fact,
the birth of a boy significantly offsets the effect for risky assets. The reallocation among the
other assets does not carry statistical significance.
Our results also indicate that when women represent a larger share of the households’
components, the share of wealth invested in safe assets increases (+0.56) as opposed to the
share of wealth invested in risky assets, which decreases by 0.38. This finding is in line
with recent literature: women are considered more risk-averse on average (Jianakoplos and
Bernasek, 2007; Schubert, Brown, Gysler, and Brachinger, 1999), and less overconfident
(Croson and Gneezy, 2009).
Taken together, these results seem to suggest that gender biases could play a role in af-
fecting financial decision making in households. A long literature has documented parental
differential treatment of daughters and sons (Sidorowicz and Sparks, 1980; Raley and Bianchi,
2006; Condry et al., 1983; Rosenzweig and Schultz, 1982). This differential treatment may
also result from biases, like, for instance, the urgency of protecting daughters, gender discrim-
ination, the adoption of gender roles, which define appropriate conduct for men and women
(Glynn and Sen, 2015; Kaul, 2018; Eagly, 1995).10 According to this literature, the birth of
a baby boy may result in the promotion of boys’ autonomy and financial independence, as
they are expected to have larger earnings opportunities as adults, whereas a new baby girl
should be provided with larger financial assets in the future, which can be considered as a
sort of dowry.
When biases affect the capacity to process relevant information, household’s portfolio
choices may depart from the rational behaviour, as in the case of households with a new baby
boy. Previous work has made significant progress in deciphering the underlying forces behind
investors’ behavioural biases (see, among others, (Cohen, 2009)). In addition, the literature
10Gender roles are shared expectations of men’s and women’s attributes and social behavior and are
internalized early in development (Bacha and Azouzi, 2019).
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on organizational architecture suggests that the decision effectiveness has its explanation in
the individual’s behavior as well as his capacity to produce, process and exchange information
and knowledge, necessary for efficient decision making to take place (Bacha and Azouzi, 2019;
Brickley, Smith, Zimmerman, and Willett, 2009). By reducing the bias that the household
has towards women, the birth of a baby girl leads to higher financial awareness and more
efficient portfolio choices (Gompers and Wang, 2017a).
4.1.3. Newborn gender and household investment controlling for household’s characteristics
The effect of the gender of a newborn on financial decisions in the basic specification in
Table 3 may be capturing particular features of the household that are correlated with the
gender of the newborn and affect also the outcome variable. To control for this in Table 4
we augment our basic model with several sets of control variables. We are aware that we
cannot control for all potential confounding variables but we are confident to have a rich set
of controls ranging from household’s structure and members’ predetermined characteristics
to education, financial education, income and risk attitudes.
Household composition
The household composition is an important determinant of portfolio allocation (Brown-
ing, 2000; Bertaut and Starr-McCluer, 2002; Carroll, 2002; Guiso, Haliassos, and Jappelli,
2002). The number of children (No. CHILDREN ) adds further information on family re-
sources available for investments, on the planning horizon of investments, and on portfolio
allocation because of different preferences within households (Browning, 2000). The portfo-
lios of households with and without children may differ because the former expect to have
to support their children until they are financially independent and/or to receive financial
support from them on a later moment, whereas the latter have to support themselves if they
live long. ISTAT (2017) reports that Italian families have kids in their 30s (the average age
at which women and men have kids is 31.89 and 34.45 years old, respectively), and that 65
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per cent of kids aged 25-29 and 30 per cent of kids aged 30-34 live with their parents. Italian
households financially support their kids longer than US families and this may impact on
portfolio choices.
We also consider the age of the head of the household (AGE HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD),
which has been extensively studied in the life-cycle portfolio investments literature (see
among others Benzoni, Collin-Dufresne, and Goldstein (2007); Campbell (2001); Haliassos
and Michaelides (2003); Gomes, Kotlikoff, and Viceira (2008); Viceira (2001)). The risky
share of financial wealth tends to vary little with age, although the specific empirical pattern
is subject to controversy (Fagereng, Gottlieb, and Guiso, 2017). Summarizing evidence from
several countries, Guiso et al. (2002) argue that the age profile of the risky share is relatively
flat. In a recent work, Fagereng et al. (2017) document a double adjustment as households
age: a rebalancing of the portfolio composition away from stocks as they approach retirement
and stock market exit after retirement. Portfolio choices may thus be influenced by the age
of the head of the household.
The facts that women usually live longer than men and that Italian wives are typically
younger than their husbands imply that wives may have more incentive to save for old age
than do husbands (Browning, 2000). Furthermore, gender specific factors may influence
portfolio choices (Croson and Gneezy, 2009; Jin, 2011). To account for possible differences
in investment behaviour due to gender we control for the presence of a female major income
earner (FEMALE HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD).
<Insert Table 4 about here>
Consistently with previous estimates, the results indicate that having a baby girl reduces
the share of financial wealth held as cash and increases the share held as retirement benefits
and risky assets, whereas having a boy reduces the share of wealth held as risky assets (Table
4 - Panel A). Older heads of household hold a higher share of their wealth in physical assets.
The elderly tend to hold safer portfolios since the ability to compensate ex post for low
returns decreases with age: in fact, real estate in Italy is usually considered by households
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as the safest investment (Bodie, Merton, and Samuelson, 1992). While these findings are in
line with the literature, including these variables in the model does not materially affect the
newborn gender coefficients. Thus, there is little evidence that the results are driven by the
household’s composition and in particular by age.
Geographical provenance
Another possibility is that geographical provenance affects household’s portfolio choices.
Geographical provenance may be seen as a proxy of cultural background and ethnicity whose
differences in wealth and asset ownership are well documented in the existing literature.
Menchik and Jianakoplos (1997) note that white households are more likely to either have
received or expect to receive some type of inheritance, which may increase their chances
of owning any given asset type. Also, Caskey (1997) finds that some black and Hispanic
households do not save because of social network pressure to share any such savings. Merry
and Thomas (2014) find that households whose head is white non-Hispanic or one of the
other minority groups have higher ownership rates of all asset types relative to black and
Hispanic households.
To investigate this possibility, we augment our baseline model with a dummy variable
BORN IN NORTHERN ITALY which takes the value of 1 if household was born in Northern
Italy and 0 otherwise.11 Cultural differences between Northern and Southern regions are still
relevant in Italy.12 In the same spirit, we create the dummy FOREIGN COUPLE which
takes the value of one if the head of household and her/his relevant other do not hold Italian
citizenship.
The results reported in Table 4 - Panel B confirm our main prediction on NEW BABY
11Northern Italy includes the following Italian regions: Valle d’Aosta, Liguria, Piemonte, Lombardia,
Veneto, Trentino Alto-Adige, Friuli Venezia Giulia and Emilia Romagna.
12According to a recent survey on daily activities, the percentage of hours per day in main activities carried
out by the population aged 15 years and over significantly varies between North and South of Italy (ISTAT,
2013). For instance, leisure time is differently allocated: in the North, 5.9 per cent of the day is devoted to
social life and entertainment versus 8 per cent in the South; 2.4 per cent of the day in the North is spent
practising sports and outdoor activities compared to 2 per cent in the South; in the North 47.5 per cent of
the day is dedicated to personal care compared to 48.7 per cent in the South.
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BORN * BOY. Including these control measures does not affect the estimated newborn
gender coefficients substantially. Hence, newborn gender does not appear to affect portfolio
choices through geographical provenance.
Education
A large amount of literature has reported the important effect of education on house-
hold portfolio choice (Jin, 2011; Haliassos and Bertaut, 1995). Unsophisticated investors
retrench from trading risky securities and shift their portfolios to safer assets (Kacperczyka,
Nosal, and Stevens, 2018). Education should help to gain information and build confi-
dence for investors. As a consequence we may argue that educated households are less risk
averse. Particularly, financial education supports the growth in knowledge and information
specifically related to financial decisions (IOSCO and OECD, 2018). Households with lower
stock market competence are more ambiguity-averse, and hold under-diversified portfolios
(Dimmock, Kouwenberg, Mitchell, and Peijnenburg (2016)). We create HIGHEST EDU-
CATION, which is a variable capturing the highest level of education in the family among
the following: primary school certificate; lower secondary school certificate; vocational sec-
ondary school diploma (3 years of study); upper secondary school diploma; 3-year university
degree/higher education diploma; 5-year university degree; postgraduate qualification. We
also extend the model including FINANCIAL EDUCATION, a principal component anal-
ysis of three indicators of financial education, that is whether the household has a credit
card, whether she uses the home banking service and whether she applies to more than one
financial intermediary when asking for consumer credit. The results reported in Table 4 -
Panel C support the main result on NEW BABY BORN * BOY. We find that education and
financial education are not significantly related to the share of wealth held in financial and
real assets, and they have no substantive impact on the coefficients on the newborn gender.
Income and attitudes
Income and wealth have been highlighted as important drivers for portfolio allocation.
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Since Aiyagari (1994) and Krusell and Smith (1998), literature emphasized the fact that rich
households are more likely to save and to hold risky assets. Households’ socioeconomic back-
ground is related to the way they learn from new financial information and make investment
decisions (Kuhnen and Miu (2017)). To investigate this possibility we include household’s net
income (NET INCOME ), its squared value (NET INCOME SQUARED) and the fraction
of income earners on the total number of family members (% INCOME EARNERS ). In the
same spirit, employment is related to the effect of background risk. Unemployed households
are exposed to unemployment risk that increases their effective risk aversion (Jin, 2011). We
create a dummy variable which takes the value of one if the head of household is employed
and zero otherwise (EMPLOYED HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD).
Another possibility is that attitudes towards financial risk influence household’s portfolio
choices. Several empirical studies have included risk attitude as an explanatory variable in
their models studying portfolio composition (King and Leape, 1987, 1998; Kelly, 1995). Re-
cent literature discusses the effect risk attitude has on the probability of holding a particular
combination of assets (Barasinska, Schaefer, and Stephan, 2012). We consider two proxies
for financial risk attitude. FINANCIAL RISK measures household’s propensity to financial
risk. It is based on the answer to the question ’In managing your financial investments, would
you say you have a preference for investments that offer:’ and ranges from 0 (if the answer
is: ’low returns, with no risk of losing the invested capital’) to 4 (if the answer is: ’very
high returns, but with a high risk of losing part of the capital’). Stock market participation
and the propensity to acquire additional assets are highly dependent on whether liquidity
and safety needs are met (Gormley et al., 2010; Barasinska et al., 2012). In particular, an
investor is more likely to add some risky assets to his or her portfolio when safety needs have
been met. To account for the important role precautionary motives play in the portfolio de-
cisions of households, we include in our specification PARENTS ALIVE, a dummy variable
which takes the value of one if household’s parents are alive and zero otherwise. In Italian
family structures, parents generally provide financial support and safety net long after their
21
children moved out.
As indicated in Table 4 - Panel D, net income and the presence of parents alive signifi-
cantly and positively impact on the share of wealth held as physical assets. These results,
however, provide little evidence that the relationship between newborn gender and portfolio
choice depends on household’s income and attitudes.
Full set
Table 5 reports the estimates of our model where we include the full set of controls.
Consistently with our findings in the basic specification, even when we control for the full
set of household’s characteristics available in our data, we find that the gender of the newborn
affects households’ decision on how to allocate their wealth among financial assets after the
birth of a new baby.
<Insert Table 5 about here>
While having a baby girl produces decisions consistent with what predicted by standard
models, that is decreases the share of liquid asset and increases the share of longer term
investments, having a boy makes the gender bias evident because the share of wealth moved
away from cash is halved as compared with the birth of a girl and the increase in risky assets
is more than offset.13
4.2. Portfolio diversification
After having investigated portfolio choice on a more detailed basis, in this section we look
at the effect of the birth of a new baby and of newborn gender on portfolio diversification.
In Table 6 we present our estimates considering as dependent variable both Div Index and
Div2 Index. First, we investigate the average effect of having a new baby (columns 1 and
2), then the heterogeneous effect according to the gender of the newborn (columns 3 and 4),
13Having the same absolute level of income leads of course to different decisions depending on the number
of people that use such income. In our estimates we take this into account by controlling for the number of
household’s members. However, our results are also robust when we insert among our controls income per
capita instead of the absolute level of income.
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and finally we include the full set of controls (columns 5 and 6).
<Insert Table 6 about here>
We find that having a new baby on average does not affect the magnitude of portfolio
diversification (Table 6 - columns 1 and 2). However, the effect is heterogeneous according to
the newborn gender. When considering the Div Index, the index of diversification is positive
(p-value=0.199) when the household has a new girl. Having a new boy, however, entails an
amount of portfolio diversification significantly lower than a new baby girl with an overall
negative effect (Table 6 - column 3). When considering the Div2 Index, again having a new
baby boy reduces diversification compared with a female newborn (-0.076, p-value=0.106)
but in this specification the final effect of a male newborn on portfolio diversification is
negative and statistically significant (-0.0757, p-value=0.078, Table 6 - column 4). In the
full specification, when households have a new baby girl, portfolio diversification measured by
Div Index significantly increases, whereas when the new baby is a boy portfolio diversification
significantly decreases (Table 6 - column 5). A similar result for the interaction term, stronger
in magnitude, is found when diversification is measured by Div2 Index (Table 6 - column 6).
Households having a baby boy diversify less their portfolio as compared to households
having a baby girl. The first group of households seems less influenced by a simple and basic
principle of financial theory, that is to hold a diversified portfolio to avoid concentrating risk
in one or few (possibly correlated) assets (Markowitz, 1952). Potential explanations for our
result are that households’ investment behaviour is shaped by whether or not the family has
a boy, which is also in line with the recent literature supporting the view that children may
shape their parents’ behaviour (Cronqvist and Yu, 2017; Glynn and Sen, 2015; Washington,
2008). Also, following Gompers and Wang (2017a), having a baby girl reduces the bias that
the household has towards women, and this leads to higher financial awareness. Gender bias
affects financial decisions and their true removal leads to more financially rational decisions.
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4.3. Robustness
We run the following additional tests.
4.3.1. Singletons
We run our full regressions excluding singletons, that is households for which we have
a unique observation and not two observations, one before and one after the birth of the
baby.14 In this way we obtain a cleaner and smaller sample. We examine the impact of
newborn gender on our two sets of dependent variables, that is on portfolio choice (Table 7)
and on portfolio diversification (Table 8). In all models we include the full set of controls,
household and time fixed effects and we cluster standard errors at the household level. The
results hold and are unchanged.
<Insert Table 7 about here>
<Insert Table 8 about here>
4.3.2. Sovereign debt crisis
While the global financial crisis of 2007-2008 impacted Italian banks and, as a conse-
quence, the real economy to a lesser extent than most other developed countries, such as
the US, the shock following the sovereign crisis of 2011 was severe. In this robustness, we
run our full specifications excluding the 2010 wave, as we want to check whether our results
are affected by the 2011 sovereign debt crisis. In Table 9 we investigate the impact of new-
born gender on portfolio choice when restricting our sample to the years 2012-2016.15 In all
specifications we include the full set of controls, household and time fixed effects.
<Insert Table 9 about here>
Table 10 reports our findings on our second set of dependent variables of interest, that is
the impact of newborn gender on portfolio diversification over the 2012-2016 sample period.
1415 households have more than two observations because they have a new baby in different waves.
15In this sample we have 67 households having a new baby and 32 new baby boys.
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<Insert Table 10 about here>
The results are qualitatively unchanged for both portfolio measures and confirm that a
new baby boy increases the fraction of wealth held as cash and reduces the fraction held
as risky assets. Also, they confirm that, when households have a new baby boy, portfolio
diversification decreases.
4.3.3. Investment in asset classes
So far we have investigated the fraction of wealth that households hold in various assets
classes and the overall portfolio diversification. In this section, we want to strengthen the
evidence of gender bias in household’s portfolio choices by focusing on the impact of newborn
gender on household’s decision to invest in the various asset classes.
With this aim we follow Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008) and create our entry variables
as dummies set to 1 for households that did not hold at t-2 and did hold at t wealth in one
of the six financial assets classes previously described (cash, safe assets, bond, retirement
benefits, life insurance, and risky assets) and 0 if the household does not hold wealth in any
of the six asset classes in t-2 and t.16
Given the way in which such variables are constructed (i.e. assigning missing values to all
observations of an household belonging to the years after it has invested into the asset class),
the sample size is different for each asset class and lower than the full sample considered in the
previous analysis. For this reason, while being able to estimate the complete specification for
five asset classes, we had to use only a subset of controls when looking at ENTRY CASH that
has only 76 observations. Such subset of controls include household composition, education,
net income and attitudes, and household and time fixed effects (Table 11).
<Insert Table 11 about here>
Data show that when the baby is a boy the likelihood of investing long term significantly
decreases. The reallocation is in favour of cash. In particular, the likelihood of investing
16The SHIW data are collected every two years.
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in retirement benefits and life insurance significantly reduces by more than 20 percentage
points. As regards risky assets, while a baby girl significantly increases the likelihood of
holding risky assets, a new baby boy in the family offsets such an effect leading to a final
variation not significantly different from zero.
The portfolio of households with children and without children is likely to differ because
a new birth affects the planning horizon of investments. According to financial theory, we
would expect households having a baby to be more likely to invest in risky assets, life insur-
ance and pension funds, regardless of the gender of the newborn, as these investments have
a longer time horizon. Our results nevertheless show different portfolio choices of parents of
boys and girls. Parenting a girl increases the probability to invest in risky assets. Parenting a
boy reduces the probability of entering in long term investments, such as retirement benefits,
life insurance and risky assets.
Our results on households’ different portfolio choices when having a new baby girl as
compared to a new baby boy are consistent across various specifications and confirm the
possible explanation for deviations from rational financial behaviour that can be found in
systematic behavioural biases (Keloharju, Knupfer, and Linnainmaa, 2012).
Despite studying the effect of the newborn gender on the decision to invest takes on
great importance and allows us to offer a more complete picture of household’s reallocation
decisions after the birth of a baby, we must acknowledge that such analysis is less robust
because of the smaller sample size and the shortage of control variables.
4.4. Seemingly unrelated regressions
When considering as dependent variables the shares of assets, we estimate a set of equa-
tions where the first six represent the share of financial wealth invested in six different asset
classes. Thus, by construction, on average the dependent variables add up to one.17 The
seventh equation represents the share of total wealth invested in physical rather than in
17As we have explained in the descriptive statistics’ section, this happens when we consider only households
with a positive level of financial wealth.
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financial assets, thus all the seven equations represent total wealth allocation. While the
equations seem unrelated, they may be related through the correlation in the errors.
In this robustness we check whether our results are robust when taking into account that
our set of equations may have contemporaneous cross-equation error correlation (i.e. the
error terms in the regression equations are correlated). With this aim we estimate first a
seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) system for the first six equations (Table 12) and then
we add also the seventh equation (Table 13). Estimates show that our results are robust
also when we allow the error terms in the equations to correlate.
<Insert Table 12 about here>
<Insert Table 13 about here>
5. Firstborn versus other children
In this section we dig deeper into our research question by investigating if our findings of
a shift towards longer term investments when the newborn is a girl rather than a boy, and
of a lower overall portfolio diversification for households having a baby boy depend on the
birth order.
Traditionally, literature investigates the drivers of intra-familial disparities in parental
investment and, consequently, on economic success across siblings. The findings indicate
that first borns have higher levels of schooling, earnings, IQ, cognitive ability, lower incidence
of teenage pregnancy, and receive more parental supervision (Behrman and Taubman, 1986;
Hanushek, 1992; Black, Devereux, and Salvanes, 2005; Conley and Glauber, 2006; Kantarevic
and Mechoulan, 2006; Black, Devereux, and Salvanes, 2010; Monfardini and See, 2010; Booth
and Kee, 2009; Price, 2008; De Haan, 2010; Hotz and Pantano, 2015).
A wide range of explanations has been put forward, like for instance differences in endow-
ments, the nature of parental preferences or financial and parental time constraints which
create unequal distribution of resources across birth order (Behrman, Pollak, and Taubman,
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1982; Behrman and Taubman, 1986; Hotz and Pantano, 2015; Oliveira, 2019).
Following this strand of literature, we might expect that not only households’ distribution
of time or resources but also their financial decisions may differ depending on whether the
change in the family composition is due to the firstborn child or to the birth of other children.
We investigate this possibility by splitting our total sample into two subsamples: one includ-
ing only firstborn children and the other including all other children who are not firstborn.
Of course, given the smaller sample sizes, our coefficients are less precisely estimated, but
even so suggestive of households’ behaviour.
In Table 14 and Table 15 we report our estimates of the impact of newborn gender on
household’s investment and portfolio diversification, respectively, by considering only the
subsample of firstborn children. We have 65 observations corresponding to 36 newborns, 16
boys and 20 girls.
<Insert Table 14 about here>
<Insert Table 15 about here>
We find that, despite the small sample size, a new baby born reduces the share of wealth
held as cash and, when the baby is a boy, there is a reduction of the share held in longer term
investments. When looking at portfolio diversification, we find that firstborn children induce
households to reduce portfolio diversification with an effect significantly bigger in case of the
birth of a baby boy.
In Table 16 and Table 17, instead, we report our estimates of the impact of newborn gen-
der on household’s investment and portfolio diversification, respectively, by considering only
the subsample of children who are not firstborn. We have 102 observations corresponding to
64 newborns, 31 boys and 33 girls.18
<Insert Table 16 about here>
<Insert Table 17 about here>
18When we have created the subsample of not firstborn children, in order to have a cleaner effect, we have
dropped 4 households having the second child in the wave following the wave of the birth of the firstborn.
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Data on household’s decision to allocate wealth among the seven asset classes show
that, following the birth of another child, there is still a reduction in the share held as
cash, but there is no longer evidence of different decisions depending on the gender of the
new child. The wealth moved away from cash is partially used to increase the share held
as retirement benefits. One possible explanation lays in the tax-advantage of retirement
benefits compared to other long-term investments, such as mutual funds or equity. Literature
has widely proved that taxation impacts investment decisions and retirement savings (see,
among others Brown, Cederburg, and O’Doherty (2017)). In Italy the favourable treatment
is particularly relevant.19 With increasing household size, as resources are finite, households
seem more likely to invest in tax-advantaged retirement benefits rather than other longer
term investments.
When looking at investment diversification, we find that households having a new baby
boy that is not a first child reduce their portfolio diversification (the effect is statistically
significant only when considering DIV2 INDEX ). It is important to draw attention to the
fact that all the coefficients in Table 16 and Table 17 are estimated controlling for the gender
of the first child (which is in the household fixed effects).
Overall, we find that the evidence of an effect of newborn gender on the share of financial
wealth held in several asset categories is driven by firstborn children, while for overall port-
folio diversification, despite the heterogeneity is bigger for firstborn children, there is also
evidence of a gender effect for other children. We would have liked to move our investigation
even further, but more detailed analyses are unfeasible due to the small sample size.
6. Conclusions
This paper shows the existence of a strong relationship between the gender of a new baby
and household’s investment choices. Even after controlling for household composition, and
19Investment in retirement benefits is deductible up to e5,164.57. Capital gain are taxed at 20%, whereas
other long term financial investments are usually taxed at 26% (COVIP (2019)).
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a variety of socio-economic characteristics, households parenting a boy offset the choice of
reducing the share of financial wealth held as cash and of increasing the share allocated to
risky assets, compared to households that are parenting a girl. Further, having a new baby
boy reduces portfolio diversification as compared to having a new baby girl. Finally, those
parenting a boy tend not to enter in long term investments, such as retirement benefits,
life insurance and risky assets. Households with a girl newborn seem to behave closer to
the prescriptions of normative models: they invest on a longer time horizon, and diversify
more their portfolio as opposed to households with a baby boy. Our results are robust to
singletons, to the sovereign crisis effect, to allowing for correlation in the error terms and
confirmed when the likelihood of investing in asset classes is investigated. Also, when digging
deeper into the birth order effect, we find that the evidence of an effect of newborn gender on
the share of financial wealth held in several asset categories is driven by firstborn children,
while for overall portfolio diversification, despite the heterogeneity is bigger for firstborn
children, there is also evidence of a gender effect for other children.
This evidence contributes to the debate of whether household sub optimal choices are
the result of mistakes or systematic behavioural biases. We view the notion that gender bias
reduces the households’ ability to take optimal investment choices as particularly interesting
in this context. The birth of a new baby girl increases parents’ awareness of their gender
bias. The genuine remove of a bias leads to financial decisions in line with standard allocation
models.
This observation could be relevant in sustaining policy interventions that aim to reach
gender equality in the family. Our results suggest that the genuine removal of a bias or
change in belief can lead to better financial investment choices.
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics
No. Of Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Dependent Variables: Asset classes
% CASH 163 .516 .473 0 1
% SAFE ASSETS 163 .023 .100 0 .699
% BOND 163 .026 .114 0 .667
% RETIREMENT BENEFITS 163 .034 .163 0 1
% LIFE INSURANCE 163 .012 .091 0 1
% RISKY ASSETS 163 .033 .148 0 .984
% PHYSICAL ASSETS 163 .813 .301 0 1
DIV INDEX 163 .387 .126 .25 .857
DIV2 INDEX 163 .321 .196 0 .612
ENTRY CASH 76 .737 .443 0 1
ENTRY SAFE ASSETS 151 .079 .271 0 1
ENTRY BOND 157 .045 .207 0 1
ENTRY RETIREMENT BENEFITS 142 .127 .334 0 1
ENTRY LIFE INSURANCE 147 .116 .321 0 1
ENTRY RISKY ASSET 157 .070 .256 0 1
Households composition variables
NEW BABY BORN 163 .638 .482 0 1
BOY 104 0.481 0.502 0 1
No. FAMILY MEMBERS 163 3.613 1.178 1 8
% FEMALES 163 .527 .182 0 1
No. CHILDREN 163 1.583 1.116 0 6
AGE HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD 163 38.847 6.829 26 84
FEMALE HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD 163 .135 .343 0 1
Geographical provenance variables
BORN IN NORTHERN ITALY 163 .307 .463 0 1
FOREIGN COUPLE 163 .215 .412 0 1
Education variables
HIGHEST EDUCATION 163 13.233 3.402 8 18
FINANCIAL EDUCATION 163 .218 1.284 -.943 3.266
Financial and employment condition and attitudes variables
NET INCOME 163 2.966 1.870 0 10.566
NET INCOME SQUARED 163 12.275 14.692 0 111.644
% INCOME EARNERS 163 .495 .245 .143 1
EMPLOYED HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD 163 .902 .298 0 1
FINANCIAL RISK 163 .693 .796 0 3
PARENTS ALIVE 163 .871 .336 0 1
The table reports the summary statistics for the seven asset classes (cash, safe assets, bond, retirement
benefits, life insurance, risky assets and physical assets) used as dependent variables in terms of share,
portfolio diversification and investment decision. It also reports our control variables divided into four main
categories: households composition, geographical provenance, education and financial and employment
condition and attitudes. Definitions of the variables are provided in Appendix 1.
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Table 2 The impact of newborn on household investment - Basic specification
% CASH % SAFEASSETS % BOND
% RETIREMENT
BENEFITS
% LIFE
INSURANCE
% RISKY
ASSETS
% PHYSICAL
ASSETS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
NEW BABY BORN -0.2786*** 0.0264 0.0227 0.0282 -0.0004 0.0629* -0.0522
(0.0631) (0.0221) (0.0205) (0.0182) (0.0065) (0.0366) (0.0683)
No. FAMILY MEMBERS 0.2055** 0.0103 0.0331 0.0149 0.0024 -0.0376 0.0829
(0.0998) (0.0128) (0.0342) (0.0461) (0.0107) (0.0434) (0.0906)
Household FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Obs. 163 163 163 163 163 163 163
Adjusted R-squared 0.185 0.023 0.071 0.005 0.005 0.026 0.126
The table reports the effect of the birth of a new baby on the share of financial wealth allocated to the six
asset classes (cash in Model 1, safe assets in Model 2, bond in Model 3, retirement benefits in Model 4, life
insurance in Model 5, risky assets in Model 6) and on the share of total wealth allocated to physical rather
than financial assets (Model 7). It includes as control variables only the size of the family and household and
time fixed effects. In all estimates standard errors (reported in parentheses) are clustered at the household
level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Definitions of the variables
are provided in Appendix 1.
Table 3 The impact of newborn gender on household investment - Basic specifi-
cation
% CASH % SAFEASSETS % BOND
% RETIREMENT
BENEFITS
% LIFE
INSURANCE
% RISKY
ASSETS
% PHYSICAL
ASSETS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
NEW BABY BORN -0.3564*** 0.0362 0.0377 0.0501** -0.0090 0.1167** -0.0804
(0.0762) (0.0326) (0.0300) (0.0233) (0.0146) (0.0483) (0.0723)
NEW BABY BORN * BOY 0.1682 -0.0379 -0.0340 -0.0523 0.0338 -0.1171* 0.0982
(0.1194) (0.0378) (0.0433) (0.0487) (0.0438) (0.0697) (0.1019)
No. FAMILY MEMBERS 0.2022** 0.0165 0.0343 0.0176 -0.0033 -0.0350 0.0687
(0.0994) (0.0149) (0.0362) (0.0475) (0.0117) (0.0354) (0.0882)
% FEMALES 0.5556** 0.0408 -0.0954 -0.1237 -0.0402 -0.3782* -0.0471
(0.2622) (0.0645) (0.0797) (0.1131) (0.0517) (0.1969) (0.1526)
Household FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Obs. 163 163 163 163 163 163 163
Adjusted R-squared 0.201 0.042 0.071 0.006 0.021 0.076 0.143
The table reports the effect of the gender of a new baby on the share of financial wealth allocated to the
six asset classes (cash in Model 1, safe assets in Model 2, bond in Model 3, retirement benefits in Model
4, life insurance in Model 5, risky assets in Model 6) and on the share of total wealth allocated to physical
rather than financial assets (Model 7). It includes as control variables the size of the family, the fraction of
women and household and time fixed effects. In all estimates standard errors (reported in parentheses) are
clustered at the household level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Definitions of the variables are provided in Appendix 1.
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Table 4 The impact of newborn gender on household investment - Sets of
controls
Panel A - Household composition
% CASH % SAFE
ASSETS
% BOND % RETIRE-
MENT BENE-
FITS
% LIFE IN-
SURANCE
% RISKY
ASSETS
% PHYS-
ICAL
ASSETS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
NEW BABY BORN -0.3906*** 0.0398 0.0229 0.0793* -0.0041 0.1174** -0.0287
(0.0739) (0.0340) (0.0261) (0.0459) (0.0129) (0.0465) (0.0657)
NEW BABY BORN * BOY 0.1832 -0.0321 -0.0262 -0.0757 0.0298 -0.1261* 0.0994
(0.1230) (0.0388) (0.0414) (0.0696) (0.0439) (0.0669) (0.1085)
No. FAMILY MEMBERS 0.2097 -0.0116 0.0107 0.1202 0.0132 -0.0093 -0.0138
(0.1516) (0.0336) (0.0354) (0.1467) (0.0213) (0.0683) (0.0984)
% FEMALES 0.7239** 0.1337 -0.0803 -0.1739 -0.0523 -0.5356** 0.1223
(0.3061) (0.1008) (0.0779) (0.2373) (0.0512) (0.2207) (0.2018)
No. CHILDREN 0.0494 0.0252 0.0485 -0.1549 -0.0253 -0.0306 0.0069
(0.1413) (0.0386) (0.0400) (0.1492) (0.0202) (0.0736) (0.1019)
AGE HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD -0.0062 0.0044 0.0002 -0.0069 -0.0011 -0.0036 0.0197***
(0.0091) (0.0032) (0.0016) (0.0087) (0.0014) (0.0055) (0.0055)
FEMALE HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD -0.2637 -0.0750 -0.0026 -0.0479 -0.0023 0.1656 -0.0428
(0.1678) (0.0479) (0.0138) (0.1299) (0.0152) (0.1001) (0.1902)
Household FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 163 163 163 163 163 163 163
Adjusted R-squared 0.219 0.075 0.067 0.039 0.004 0.128 0.220
Panel B - Geographical provenance
% CASH % SAFE
ASSETS
% BOND % RETIRE-
MENT BENE-
FITS
% LIFE IN-
SURANCE
% RISKY
ASSETS
% PHYS-
ICAL
ASSETS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
NEW BABY BORN -0.3612*** 0.0363 0.0396 0.0508** -0.0080 0.1191** -0.0821
(0.0776) (0.0327) (0.0313) (0.0241) (0.0146) (0.0490) (0.0739)
NEW BABY BORN * BOY 0.1820 -0.0373 -0.0389 -0.0540 0.0305 -0.1246* 0.1005
(0.1247) (0.0378) (0.0456) (0.0531) (0.0430) (0.0734) (0.1064)
No. FAMILY MEMBERS 0.1987* 0.0170 0.0361 0.0181 -0.0029 -0.0337 0.0659
(0.1023) (0.0149) (0.0368) (0.0498) (0.0118) (0.0347) (0.0888)
% FEMALES 0.6219* 0.0459 -0.1160 -0.1316 -0.0579 -0.4164* -0.0453
(0.3189) (0.0802) (0.0982) (0.1382) (0.0565) (0.2397) (0.1921)
BORN IN NORTHERN ITALY 0.0323 -0.0126 -0.0250 -0.0069 0.0019 -0.0065 0.0538
(0.1099) (0.0240) (0.0204) (0.0359) (0.0071) (0.0383) (0.1595)
FOREIGN COUPLE -0.1997 -0.0118 0.0659 0.0245 0.0509 0.1120 -0.0181
(0.2210) (0.0621) (0.0555) (0.0884) (0.0360) (0.1478) (0.1295)
Household FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 163 163 163 163 163 163 163
Adjusted R-squared 0.192 0.030 0.065 -0.007 0.010 0.067 0.134
Continued on next page
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Table 4 The impact of newborn gender on household investment - Sets of
controls - continued
Panel C - Education
% CASH % SAFE
ASSETS
% BOND % RETIRE-
MENT BENE-
FITS
% LIFE IN-
SURANCE
% RISKY
ASSETS
% PHYS-
ICAL
ASSETS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
NEW BABY BORN -0.3554*** 0.0361 0.0378 0.0504** -0.0092 0.1164** -0.0809
(0.0766) (0.0330) (0.0292) (0.0237) (0.0151) (0.0483) (0.0718)
NEW BABY BORN * BOY 0.1629 -0.0370 -0.0321 -0.0499 0.0329 -0.1186* 0.0999
(0.1216) (0.0378) (0.0381) (0.0501) (0.0434) (0.0706) (0.1027)
No. FAMILY MEMBERS 0.1871** 0.0165 0.0307 0.0101 0.0005 -0.0271 0.0777
(0.0865) (0.0197) (0.0231) (0.0532) (0.0103) (0.0362) (0.0896)
% FEMALES 0.6053** 0.0406 -0.0839 -0.0996 -0.0526 -0.4041* -0.0766
(0.2937) (0.0777) (0.0706) (0.1273) (0.0525) (0.2044) (0.1504)
HIGHEST EDUCATION -0.0870 0.0076 0.0069 -0.0010 0.0034 0.0098 0.0392
(0.0577) (0.0084) (0.0099) (0.0097) (0.0057) (0.0125) (0.0275)
FINANCIAL EDUCATION -0.0234 0.0058 0.0157 0.0209 -0.0085 -0.0157 0.0041
(0.0517) (0.0221) (0.0403) (0.0196) (0.0102) (0.0153) (0.0380)
Household FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 163 163 163 163 163 163 163
Adjusted R-squared 0.219 0.033 0.075 0.004 0.012 0.069 0.143
Panel D - Income and attitude
% CASH % SAFE
ASSETS
% BOND % RETIRE-
MENT BENE-
FITS
% LIFE IN-
SURANCE
% RISKY
ASSETS
% PHYS-
ICAL
ASSETS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
NEW BABY BORN -0.3707*** 0.0263 0.0419 0.0495* -0.0058 0.1271*** -0.0760
(0.0805) (0.0266) (0.0318) (0.0295) (0.0113) (0.0474) (0.0678)
NEW BABY BORN * BOY 0.1999 -0.0458 -0.0312 -0.0346 0.0268 -0.1293* 0.0800
(0.1369) (0.0404) (0.0540) (0.0461) (0.0343) (0.0686) (0.1100)
No. FAMILY MEMBERS 0.1740* -0.0103 0.0393 0.0214 0.0076 -0.0316 0.0826
(0.0998) (0.0273) (0.0395) (0.0696) (0.0121) (0.0390) (0.0964)
% FEMALES 0.7229** 0.0329 -0.0795 -0.0437 -0.0797 -0.4129* 0.0173
(0.3240) (0.0650) (0.0890) (0.1095) (0.0756) (0.2102) (0.2009)
NET INCOME 0.1311 0.0270 0.0073 0.0422 -0.0096 -0.0142 0.1389*
(0.1588) (0.0234) (0.0262) (0.0590) (0.0183) (0.0405) (0.0735)
NET INCOME SQUARED -0.0051 0.0003 -0.0014 -0.0024 -0.0023 -0.0019 -0.0143*
(0.0176) (0.0040) (0.0031) (0.0076) (0.0030) (0.0059) (0.0084)
% OF INCOME EARNERS -0.1287 -0.2112 0.0479 0.0666 0.0391 0.0131 -0.0348
(0.2945) (0.1769) (0.0671) (0.1802) (0.0411) (0.1152) (0.2693)
EMPLOYED HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD -0.1216 0.0345 -0.0063 -0.0787 -0.0024 0.0408 0.0211
(0.2714) (0.0365) (0.0274) (0.0725) (0.0158) (0.0388) (0.0837)
FINANCIAL RISK 0.0098 0.0006 -0.0142 0.0093 0.0091 -0.0427 0.0315
(0.0505) (0.0139) (0.0259) (0.0123) (0.0113) (0.0263) (0.0503)
PARENTS ALIVE 0.1025 -0.0006 -0.0089 0.0387 0.0040 -0.0975 0.0772*
(0.1474) (0.0153) (0.0141) (0.0359) (0.0109) (0.0704) (0.0462)
Household FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 163 163 163 163 163 163 163
Adjusted R-squared 0.223 0.091 0.045 0.018 0.044 0.118 0.165
The table reports the effect of the gender of a new baby on the share of financial wealth allocated to the
six asset classes (cash in Model 1, safe assets in Model 2, bond in Model 3, retirement benefits in Model
4, life insurance in Model 5, risky assets in Model 6) and on the share of total wealth allocated to physical
rather than financial assets (Model 7). Panel A includes a set of controls related to household composition;
Panel B controls for geographical provenance; Panel C includes controls for education; and Panel D reports
controls for income and attitudes. All estimates include household and time fixed effects and standard errors
(reported in parentheses) are clustered at the household level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%,
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Definitions of the variables are provided in Appendix 1.
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Table 5 The impact of newborn gender on household investment - full specifica-
tion
% CASH % SAFEASSETS % BOND
% RETIREMENT
BENEFITS
% LIFE
INSURANCE
% RISKY
ASSETS
% PHYSICAL
ASSETS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
NEW BABY BORN -0.4499*** 0.0206 0.0352 0.0818 0.0093 0.1442*** -0.0424
(0.0759) (0.0281) (0.0329) (0.0587) (0.0117) (0.0512) (0.0665)
NEW BABY BORN * BOY 0.2250* -0.0151 -0.0206 -0.0730 0.0074 -0.1548** 0.1231
(0.1368) (0.0341) (0.0445) (0.0892) (0.0261) (0.0740) (0.1154)
No. FAMILY MEMBERS 0.0447 -0.0594 0.0245 0.1090 0.0668 0.0649 -0.0560
(0.1418) (0.0495) (0.0426) (0.1876) (0.0433) (0.0812) (0.1136)
% FEMALES 1.1728** 0.2605 -0.0613 -0.1466 -0.1958 -0.7348** 0.2981
(0.4492) (0.1571) (0.1351) (0.3791) (0.1192) (0.2905) (0.3119)
No. CHILDREN 0.1686 0.0401 0.0488 -0.1495 -0.0704 -0.0907 0.0959
(0.1610) (0.0581) (0.0521) (0.1599) (0.0453) (0.0862) (0.1330)
AGE HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD 0.0004 0.0052 -0.0003 -0.0067 -0.0042* -0.0079 0.0228***
(0.0096) (0.0043) (0.0025) (0.0105) (0.0024) (0.0067) (0.0070)
FEMALE HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD -0.2484 -0.1002 -0.0057 -0.0344 -0.0184 0.1513 -0.0113
(0.2401) (0.0805) (0.0312) (0.1685) (0.0147) (0.1200) (0.2139)
BORN IN NORTHERN ITALY -0.0299 -0.0109 -0.0201 -0.0052 0.0048 0.0319 0.0414
(0.0915) (0.0194) (0.0183) (0.0314) (0.0127) (0.0397) (0.1882)
FOREIGN COUPLE -0.6635* -0.2730 0.0785 0.0768 0.1483 0.3366* -0.1615
(0.3743) (0.1809) (0.1089) (0.3310) (0.1039) (0.1713) (0.2269)
HIGHEST EDUCATION -0.1214** -0.0014 0.0120 -0.0103 0.0105 0.0318* 0.0060
(0.0549) (0.0081) (0.0123) (0.0137) (0.0090) (0.0170) (0.0241)
FINANCIAL EDUCATION -0.0371 0.0074 0.0194 0.0224 -0.0099 -0.0152 0.0146
(0.0599) (0.0210) (0.0409) (0.0185) (0.0123) (0.0168) (0.0401)
NET INCOME 0.1708 0.0297 0.0185 0.0236 -0.0076 -0.0075 0.1078
(0.1833) (0.0268) (0.0252) (0.0527) (0.0208) (0.0466) (0.0679)
NET INCOME SQUARED -0.0081 -0.0003 -0.0031 -0.0016 -0.0034 -0.0025 -0.0105
(0.0201) (0.0050) (0.0031) (0.0086) (0.0036) (0.0073) (0.0078)
% INCOME EARNERS -0.4512 -0.2297 0.1041 0.0124 0.0333 0.0944 0.0702
(0.2897) (0.1685) (0.0689) (0.1667) (0.0413) (0.1146) (0.2435)
EMPLOYED HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD 0.1133 0.0253 -0.0657 -0.0265 -0.0410 -0.0689 -0.0438
(0.2297) (0.0280) (0.0430) (0.0787) (0.0363) (0.0627) (0.1901)
FINANCIAL RISK 0.0219 -0.0109 -0.0214 -0.0009 0.0052 -0.0353 0.0217
(0.0638) (0.0202) (0.0248) (0.0261) (0.0110) (0.0296) (0.0532)
PARENTS ALIVE 0.1166 -0.0154 -0.0111 0.0283 0.0060 -0.0808 0.0500
(0.1203) (0.0224) (0.0203) (0.0459) (0.0134) (0.0796) (0.0607)
Household FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Obs. 163 163 163 163 163 163 163
Adjusted R-squared 0.278 0.118 0.061 -0.001 0.032 0.150 0.210
The table reports the effect of the gender of a new baby on the share of financial wealth allocated to the six
asset classes (cash in Model 1, safe assets in Model 2, bond in Model 3, retirement benefits in Model 4, life
insurance in Model 5, risky assets in Model 6) and on the share of total wealth allocated to physical rather
than financial assets (Model 7). It includes as control variables household and time fixed effects plus the full
set of our control variables. In all estimates standard errors (reported in parentheses) are clustered at the
household level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Definitions of
the variables are provided in Appendix 1.
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Table 6 The impact of newborn and of newborn gender on investment diversifi-
cation
DIV INDEX DIV2 INDEX DIV INDEX DIV2 INDEX DIV INDEX DIV2 INDEX
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NEW BABY BORN 0.0099 -0.0339 0.0259 0.0006 0.0394** 0.0090
(0.0156) (0.0259) (0.0200) (0.0278) (0.0195) (0.0257)
NEW BABY BORN * BOY -0.0415* -0.0764 -0.0505** -0.1404**
(0.0230) (0.0468) (0.0240) (0.0564)
Controls basic Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Controls full No No No No Yes Yes
Household FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Obs. 163 163 163 163 163 163
Adjusted R-squared 0.122 0.135 0.138 0.173 0.210 0.308
The table reports the results of the effects of the birth of a new baby (Model 1 and Model 2) and of the
newborn gender (Model 3 - Model 6) on two aggregate indexes of investment diversification (DIV INDEX
and DIV2 INDEX ). Model 3 - Model 6 include the interaction between the new baby born dummy and the
baby gender dummy, NEW BABY BORN * BOY, which takes the value of 1 if the new baby is a boy rather
than a girl. Model 1 - Model 4 include only the control variables present in the basic specifications as in Table
2 and Table 3. Model 5 and Model 6 include the full set of controls as in Table 5. In all estimates standard
errors (reported in parentheses) are clustered at the household level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Definitions of the variables are provided in Appendix 1.
Table 7 The impact of newborn gender on household investment - Without sin-
gletons
% CASH % SAFEASSETS % BOND
% RETIREMENT
BENEFITS
% LIFE
INSURANCE
% RISKY
ASSETS
% PHYSICAL
ASSETS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
NEW BABY BORN -0.4499*** 0.0206 0.0352 0.0818 0.0093 0.1442*** -0.0424
(0.0770) (0.0285) (0.0334) (0.0596) (0.0119) (0.0519) (0.0675)
NEW BABY BORN * BOY 0.2250 -0.0151 -0.0206 -0.0730 0.0074 -0.1548** 0.1231
(0.1388) (0.0346) (0.0452) (0.0905) (0.0265) (0.0751) (0.1171)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Obs. 139 139 139 139 139 139 139
Adjusted R-squared 0.520 0.109 0.224 -0.097 -0.036 0.044 0.486
The table reports the effect of the gender of a new baby on the share of financial wealth allocated to the six
asset classes (cash in Model 1, safe assets in Model 2, bond in Model 3, retirement benefits in Model 4, life
insurance in Model 5, risky assets in Model 6) and on the share of total wealth allocated to physical rather
than financial assets (Model 7). All models include the interaction between the new baby born dummy
and the baby gender dummy, NEW BABY BORN * BOY, which takes the value of 1 if the new baby
is a boy rather than a girl and do not include singletons, that is households for which we have a unique
observation. The table includes as control variables household and time fixed effects plus the full set of our
control variables. In all estimates standard errors (reported in parentheses) are clustered at the household
level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Definitions of the variables
are provided in Appendix 1.
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Table 8 The impact of newborn gender on investment diversification - Without
singletons
DIV INDEX DIV2 INDEX
(1) (2)
NEW BABY BORN 0.0394* 0.0090
(0.0198) (0.0261)
NEW BABY BORN * BOY -0.0505** -0.1404**
(0.0243) (0.0572)
Controls Yes Yes
Household FE Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes
No. of Obs. 139 139
Adjusted R-squared 0.734 0.755
The table reports the results of the effects of the gender of a new baby on two aggregate indexes of investment
diversification (DIV INDEX and DIV2 INDEX ). Both models include the interaction between the new baby
born dummy and the baby gender dummy, NEW BABY BORN * BOY, which takes the value of 1 if the
new baby is a boy rather than a girl, household and time fixed effects plus the full set of controls as in Table
5. In all estimates standard errors (reported in parentheses) are clustered at the household level. *, **, and
*** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Definitions of the variables are provided
in Appendix 1.
Table 9 The impact of newborn gender on household investment - Sovereign debt
crisis
% CASH % SAFEASSETS % BOND
% RETIREMENT
BENEFITS
% LIFE
INSURANCE
% RISKY
ASSETS
% PHYSICAL
ASSETS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
NEW BABY BORN -0.2206 0.0151 -0.0061 0.0625* 0.0395 0.1417 0.0528
(0.1489) (0.0815) (0.0049) (0.0374) (0.0390) (0.1107) (0.1078)
NEW BABY BORN * BOY 0.3416*** -0.0471 -0.0070 -0.0053 0.0282 -0.1536** 0.1910
(0.1193) (0.0617) (0.0070) (0.0397) (0.0736) (0.0716) (0.1683)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Obs. 102 102 102 102 102 102 102
Adjusted R-squared 0.528 0.131 0.463 0.562 -0.004 0.263 0.497
The table checks the robustness of the results shown in Table 3, Table 4 and Table 5 when restricting the
sample to the years 2012-2016. It reports the effect of the gender of a new baby on the share of financial
wealth allocated to the six asset classes (cash in Model 1, safe assets in Model 2, bond in Model 3, retirement
benefits in Model 4, life insurance in Model 5, risky assets in Model 6) and on the share of total wealth
allocated to physical rather than financial assets (Model 7). All models include the interaction between the
new baby born dummy and the baby gender dummy, NEW BABY BORN * BOY, which takes the value of
1 if the new baby is a boy rather than a girl, household and time fixed effects plus the full set of our control
variables. In all estimates standard errors (reported in parentheses) are clustered at the household level. *,
**, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Definitions of the variables are
provided in Appendix 1.
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Table 10 The impact of newborn gender on investment diversification - Sovereign
debt crisis
DIV INDEX DIV2 INDEX
(1) (2)
NEW BABY BORN 0.0379 0.0458
(0.0246) (0.0652)
NEW BABY BORN * BOY -0.0896*** -0.1212*
(0.0318) (0.0630)
Controls full Yes Yes
Household FE Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes
No. of Obs. 102 102
Adjusted R-squared 0.299 0.254
The table checks the robustness of the results shown in Table 6 when restricting the sample to the years
2012-2016. It reports the results of the effects of the newborn gender on two aggregate indexes of investment
diversification (DIV INDEX and DIV2 INDEX ). Both models include the interaction between the new baby
born dummy and the baby gender dummy, NEW BABY BORN * BOY, which takes the value of 1 if the
new baby is a boy rather than a girl, household and time fixed effects plus the full set of our control variables.
In all estimates standard errors (reported in parentheses) are clustered at the household level. *, **, and
*** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Definitions of the variables are provided
in Appendix 1.
Table 11 The impact of newborn gender on households’ decision to invest
ENTRY
CASH
ENTRY
SAFE ASSETS
ENTRY
BOND
ENTRY
RETIREMENT
BENEFITS
ENTRY LIFE
INSURANCE
ENTRY
RISKY ASSETS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NEW BABY BORN 0.8910*** -0.1011 0.0358 0.0690 0.0539 0.2119***
(0.1335) (0.0909) (0.0327) (0.0548) (0.0708) (0.0761)
NEW BABY BORN * BOY 0.8048*** 0.1848 0.0564 -0.2268* -0.2196** -0.1762*
(0.1021) (0.1267) (0.0494) (0.1160) (0.0932) (0.1058)
Controls Yes+ Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Obs. 76 151 157 142 147 157
Adjusted R-squared 0.988 0.186 0.154 0.223 0.204 0.179
The table reports the results of the effects of the newborn gender on the household’s decision to invest in
the six asset classes (cash in Model 1, safe assets in Model 2, bond in Model 3, retirement benefits in Model
4, life insurance in Model 5, risky assets in Model 6). All models include the interaction between the new
baby born dummy and the baby gender dummy, NEW BABY BORN * BOY, which takes the value of 1 if
the new baby is a boy rather than a girl. + Model 1 includes a partial set of control variables: it does not
include controls related to geography and it does not include Net Income Squared, % of Income Earners and
Employed Head of Household. In all estimates standard errors (reported in parentheses) are clustered at the
household level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Definitions of
the variables are provided in Appendix 1.
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Table 12 The impact of newborn gender on household investment - SUR system
without % Physical Assets
% CASH % SAFEASSETS % BOND
% RETIREMENT
BENEFITS
% LIFE
INSURANCE
% RISKY
ASSETS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NEW BABY BORN -0.449*** 0.0210 0.0356 0.0822** 0.00920 0.143***
(-6.39) (0.96) (1.66) (2.85) (0.42) (4.89)
NEW BABY BORN * BOY 0.216* -0.00409 -0.0195 -0.0495 0.00813 -0.202***
(2.31) (-0.14) (-0.68) (-1.29) (0.28) (-5.23)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Obs. 163 163 163 163 163 163
R-squared 0.835 0.647 0.735 0.767 0.573 0.710
The table checks the robustness of the results shown in Table 5 when the error terms in the equations are
allowed to correlate. It reports the effect of the gender of a new baby on the share of financial wealth
allocated to the six asset classes (cash in Model 1, safe assets in Model 2, bond in Model 3, retirement
benefits in Model 4, life insurance in Model 5, risky assets in Model 6). All models include the interaction
between the new baby born dummy and the baby gender dummy, NEW BABY BORN * BOY, which takes
the value of 1 if the new baby is a boy rather than a girl, household and time fixed effects plus the full set of
our control variables. The standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance
at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Definitions of the variables are provided in Appendix 1.
Table 13 The impact of newborn gender on household investment - SUR system
with % Physical Assets
% CASH % SAFEASSETS % BOND
% RETIREMENT
BENEFITS
% LIFE
INSURANCE
% RISKY
ASSETS
% PHYSICAL
ASSETS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
NEW BABY BORN -0.449*** 0.0210 0.0356 0.0822** 0.00920 0.143*** -0.0434
(-6.39) (0.96) (1.66) (2.85) (0.42) (4.89) (-0.88)
NEW BABY BORN * BOY 0.216* -0.00409 -0.0195 -0.0495 0.00813 -0.202*** 0.112
(2.31) (-0.14) (-0.68) (-1.29) (0.28) (-5.23) (1.71)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Obs. 163 163 163 163 163 163 163
R-squared 0.835 0.647 0.735 0.767 0.573 0.710 0.801
The table checks the robustness of the results shown in Table 5 when the error terms in the equations are
allowed to correlate. It reports the effect of the gender of a new baby on the share of financial wealth
allocated to the six asset classes (cash in Model 1, safe assets in Model 2, bond in Model 3, retirement
benefits in Model 4, life insurance in Model 5, risky assets in Model 6) and on the share of total wealth
allocated to physical rather than financial assets (Model 7). All models include the interaction between the
new baby born dummy and the baby gender dummy, NEW BABY BORN * BOY, which takes the value of
1 if the new baby is a boy rather than a girl, household and time fixed effects plus the full set of our control
variables. The standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%,
and 1% levels, respectively. Definitions of the variables are provided in Appendix 1.
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Table 14 The impact of newborn gender on household investment - First Child
% CASH % SAFEASSETS % BOND
% RETIREMENT
BENEFITS
% LIFE
INSURANCE
% RISKY
ASSETS
% PHYSICAL
ASSETS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
NEW BABY BORN -0.5994* 0.0454 0.0102 0.0093 -0.0121 0.2676 -0.0218
(0.3528) (0.1760) (0.0201) (0.0926) (0.0130) (0.2472) (0.2325)
NEW BABY BORN * BOY 0.1983 -0.1364 -0.0177 0.0677 -0.0190*** -0.4722*** 0.0363
(0.1680) (0.1021) (0.0156) (0.0697) (0.0066) (0.1321) (0.1194)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Obs. 65 65 65 65 65 65 65
Adjusted R-squared 0.745 0.430 0.188 0.555 0.811 0.715 0.545
The table reports the effect of the gender of a new baby on the share of financial wealth allocated to the
six asset classes (cash in Model 1, safe assets in Model 2, bond in Model 3, retirement benefits in Model
4, life insurance in Model 5, risky assets in Model 6) and on the share of total wealth allocated to physical
rather than financial assets (Model 7). The sample includes only firstborn children. All models include the
interaction between the new baby born dummy and the baby gender dummy, NEW BABY BORN * BOY,
which takes the value of 1 if the new baby is a boy rather than a girl and do not include singletons, that
is households for which we have a unique observation. The table includes as control variables household
and time fixed effects plus the full set of our control variables. In all estimates standard errors (reported in
parentheses) are clustered at the household level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels, respectively. Definitions of the variables are provided in Appendix 1.
Table 15 The impact of newborn gender on investment diversification - First
Child
DIV INDEX DIV2 INDEX
(1) (2)
NEW BABY BORN -0.1592* -0.4685***
(0.0785) (0.1095)
NEW BABY BORN * BOY -0.1217** -0.3311***
(0.0481) (0.0624)
Controls Yes Yes
Household FE Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes
No. of Obs. 65 65
Adjusted R-squared 0.633 0.736
The table reports the results of the effects of the gender of a new baby on two aggregate indexes of investment
diversification (DIV INDEX and DIV2 INDEX ). The sample includes only firstborn children. Both models
include the interaction between the new baby born dummy and the baby gender dummy, NEW BABY BORN
* BOY, which takes the value of 1 if the new baby is a boy rather than a girl, household and time fixed
effects plus the full set of controls as in Table 5. In all estimates standard errors (reported in parentheses) are
clustered at the household level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Definitions of the variables are provided in Appendix 1.
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Table 16 The impact of newborn gender on household investment - Other Chil-
dren
% CASH % SAFEASSETS % BOND
% RETIREMENT
BENEFITS
% LIFE
INSURANCE
% RISKY
ASSETS
% PHYSICAL
ASSETS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
NEW BABY BORN -0.4316** -0.0153 0.0158 0.2811** 0.0700 -0.1118 -0.2517
(0.2149) (0.0167) (0.0793) (0.1250) (0.0712) (0.0718) (0.1507)
NEW BABY BORN * BOY 0.2076 -0.0102 -0.1337 0.0297 -0.0571 0.0084 0.4834
(0.3319) (0.0151) (0.1014) (0.1039) (0.0610) (0.0657) (0.2997)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Obs. 102 102 102 102 102 102 102
Adjusted R-squared 0.396 0.205 0.390 0.678 -0.045 0.495 0.525
The table reports the effect of the gender of a new baby on the share of financial wealth allocated to the six
asset classes (cash in Model 1, safe assets in Model 2, bond in Model 3, retirement benefits in Model 4, life
insurance in Model 5, risky assets in Model 6) and on the share of total wealth allocated to physical rather
than financial assets (Model 7). The sample includes only children who are not firstborn. All models include
the interaction between the new baby born dummy and the baby gender dummy, NEW BABY BORN *
BOY, which takes the value of 1 if the new baby is a boy rather than a girl and do not include singletons,
that is households for which we have a unique observation. The table includes as control variables household
and time fixed effects plus the full set of our control variables. In all estimates standard errors (reported in
parentheses) are clustered at the household level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels, respectively. Definitions of the variables are provided in Appendix 1.
Table 17 The impact of newborn gender on investment diversification - Other
Children
DIV INDEX DIV2 INDEX
(1) (2)
NEW BABY BORN 0.0209 0.0070
(0.0322) (0.0489)
NEW BABY BORN * BOY -0.0073 -0.1406*
(0.0416) (0.0717)
Controls Yes Yes
Household FE Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes
No. of Obs. 102 102
Adjusted R-squared 0.323 0.524
The table reports the results of the effects of the gender of a new baby on two aggregate indexes of investment
diversification (DIV INDEX and DIV2 INDEX ). The sample includes only children who are not firstborn.
Both models include the interaction between the new baby born dummy and the baby gender dummy, NEW
BABY BORN * BOY, which takes the value of 1 if the new baby is a boy rather than a girl, household and
time fixed effects plus the full set of controls as in Table 5. In all estimates standard errors (reported in
parentheses) are clustered at the household level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels, respectively. Definitions of the variables are provided in Appendix 1.
41
Appendix 1 Variable definitions
Name Definition
% CASH Share of financial assets held in cash, defined as bank or postal de-
posits (current, saving accounts or deposit books)
% SAFE ASSETS Share of financial assets held in safe assets, defined as certificates
of deposit, repos, postal savings certificates, and Italian government
bonds, such as T-bills, T-certificates and T-bonds
% BOND Share of financial assets held in bond, defined as bonds issued by
Italian firms and banks, money market funds and ETF, debt funds
and foreign government securities
% RETIREMENT BENEFITS Share of financial assets held in retirement benefits which include per-
sonal retirement plan or supplementary pension fund; state pension
is excluded
% LIFE INSURANCE Share of financial assets held in life insurance. It contains cash value
life insurance but does not include insurance policies that provide a
supplementary pension, such as individual pension plans
% RISKY ASSETS Share of financial assets held in risky assets: stocks, shares of un-
listed companies, shares in companies limited by shares - srl, shares
of partnerships, mutual funds or ETF in equities and in foreign cur-
rencies, foreign equities, other foreign securities and other financial
assets such as derivative securities, royalties
% PHYSICAL ASSETS Share of total net worth held in real estate and in transport equip-
ment (durables)
DIV INDEX Sum of quartileac where ac is the asset class, that is sum of seven
discrete variables ranging from 1 to 4 based on the quartile (bottom
to top) of the sample distribution computed by year they fall into,
divided by 28
DIV2 INDEX Squared value of the percentage of asset classes held in each quartile
(that is the number of asset classes held in each quartile divided
by 7, the total number of asset classes) summed up and this value
subtracted from 1
ENTRY CASH Dummy variable which takes the value of 1 for households that hold
cash in t but not in t-2; 0 for households that do not hold cash both
in t-2 and in t; missing otherwise
ENTRY SAFE ASSETS Dummy variable which takes the value of 1 for households that hold
safe assets in t but not in t-2; 0 for households that do not hold safe
assets both in t-2 and in t; missing otherwise
ENTRY BOND Dummy variable which takes the value of 1 for households that hold
bond in t but not in t-2; 0 for households that do not hold bond both
in t-2 and in t; missing otherwise
ENTRY RETIREMENT BENEFITS Dummy variable which takes the value of 1 for households that hold
retirement benefits in t but not in t-2; 0 for households that do not
hold retirement benefits both in t-2 and in t; missing otherwise
ENTRY LIFE INSURANCE Dummy variable which takes the value of 1 for households that hold
life insurance in t but not in t-2; 0 for households that do not hold
life insurance both in t-2 and in t; missing otherwise
ENTRY RISKY ASSETS Dummy variable which takes the value of 1 for households that hold
risky assets in t but not in t-2; 0 for households that do not hold
risky assets both in t-2 and in t; missing otherwise
Continued on next page
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Appendix 1 continued
Name Definition
NEWBORN Dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if household has a new
baby; 0 otherwise
BOY Dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if household has a new
baby boy; 0 otherwise
No FAMILY MEMBERS Number of components of the family
% FEMALES Number of females/total number of family members
No CHILDREN Number of children
AGE HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD Age of the head of household, defined as the major income earner
FEMALE HEAD OF HOUSE-
HOLD
Dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the head of household,
defined as the major income earner, is a woman
BORN IN NORTHERN ITALY Dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the principal respondent
was born in norhern Italy, that is Valle d’Aosta, Piemonte, Liguria,
Lombardia, Veneto, Trentino Alto Adige, Friuli Venezia Giulia and
Emilia Romagna region; 0 otherwise
FOREIGN COUPLE Dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if both the principal
respondent and his wife/her husband do not hold Italian citizenship;
0 otherwise
HIGHEST EDUCATION The highest level of education in the family among the following: pri-
mary school certificate; lower secondary school certificate; vocational
secondary school diploma (3 years of study); upper secondary school
diploma; 3-year university degree/higher education diploma; 5-year
university degree; postgraduate qualification
FINANCIAL EDUCATION Principal component analysis of three indicators of financial educa-
tion, that is whether the household has a credit card, whether she
uses the home banking service and whether she applies to more than
one financial intermediary when asking for consumer credit
NET INCOME Household net income
NET INCOME SQUARED Square value of household net income
% INCOME EARNERS Number of income earners/total number of family members
EMPLOYED HEAD OF
HOUSEHOLD
Dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the head of household,
defined as the major income earner, is employed
FINANCIAL RISK Household propensity to financial risk. It is based on the answer to
the question ’In managing your financial investments, would you say
you have a preference for investments that offer:’ and ranges from
0 (if the answer is: low returns, with no risk of losing the invested
capital) to 4 (if the answer is: very high returns, but with a high risk
of losing part of the capital)
PARENTS ALIVE Dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if parents of the principal
respondent are alive; 0 otherwise
The table defines the variables used in the study. The source of the data is Bank of Italy (2018).
43
A
p
p
en
d
ix
2
C
or
re
la
ti
on
m
at
ri
x
% C
A
SH
%
SA
F
E
A
SS
E
T
S
% B
O
N
D
%
R
E
T
IR
E
-
M
E
N
T
B
E
N
E
-
F
IT
S
%
LI
F
E
IN
-
SU
R
A
N
C
E
% R
IS
K
Y
A
SS
E
T
S
%
P
H
Y
S-
IC
A
L
A
S-
SE
T
S
D
IV
IN
-
D
E
X
D
IV
2
IN
D
E
X
E
N
T
R
Y
C
A
SH
E
N
T
R
Y
SA
F
E
A
S-
SE
T
S
E
N
T
R
Y
B
O
N
D
E
N
T
R
Y
R
E
-
T
IR
E
M
E
N
T
B
E
N
E
F
IT
S
E
N
T
R
Y
LI
F
E
IN
-
SU
R
A
N
C
E
E
N
T
R
Y
R
IS
K
Y
A
S-
SE
T
S
N
o
FA
M
IL
Y
M
E
M
B
E
R
S
%
F
E
-
M
A
LE
S
N
o
C
H
IL
-
D
R
E
N
A
G
E
H
E
A
D
O
F
H
O
U
SE
-
H
O
LD
F
E
M
A
LE
H
E
A
D
O
F
H
O
U
SE
-
H
O
LD
B
O
R
N
IN
N
O
R
T
H
-
E
R
N
IT
A
LY
FO
R
E
IG
N
C
O
U
P
LE
H
IG
H
E
ST
E
D
U
C
A
-
T
IO
N
F
IN
A
N
C
IA
L
E
D
U
C
A
-
T
IO
N
N
E
T
IN
-
C
O
M
E
%
IN
C
O
M
E
E
A
R
N
E
R
S
E
M
P
LO
Y
E
D
H
E
A
D
O
F
H
O
U
SE
-
H
O
LD
F
IN
A
N
C
IA
L
R
IS
K
PA
R
E
N
T
S
A
LI
V
E
%
C
A
SH
1
%
SA
F
E
A
SS
E
T
S
-0
.0
55
1
0.
48
56
%
B
O
N
D
-0
.1
28
0.
14
02
*
1
0.
10
44
0.
07
43
%
R
E
T
IR
E
M
E
N
T
B
E
N
E
F
IT
S
-0
.1
84
4*
-0
.0
40
9
0.
02
1
1
0.
01
85
0.
60
43
0.
79
%
LI
F
E
IN
SU
R
A
N
C
E
-0
.0
76
-0
.0
29
3
-0
.0
32
0.
00
61
1
0.
33
53
0.
71
03
0.
68
6
0.
93
83
%
R
IS
K
Y
A
SS
E
T
S
-0
.1
63
9*
-0
.0
02
8
0.
10
2
-0
.0
10
5
-0
.0
05
8
1
0.
03
66
0.
97
18
0.
19
6
0.
89
38
0.
94
15
%
P
H
Y
SI
C
A
L
A
SS
E
T
S
-0
.0
79
-0
.0
54
7
-0
.0
04
0.
07
97
0.
02
19
-0
.0
67
2
1
0.
31
91
0.
48
8
0.
96
4
0.
31
21
0.
78
13
0.
39
43
D
IV
IN
D
E
X
0.
22
23
*
0.
33
06
*
0.
43
75
*
0.
17
86
*
0.
18
86
*
0.
37
67
*
0.
01
55
1
0.
00
43
0
0
0.
02
26
0.
01
59
0
0.
84
4
D
IV
2
IN
D
E
X
0.
48
78
*
0.
26
03
*
0.
27
28
*
0.
17
84
*
0.
11
71
0.
29
84
*
0.
14
75
*
0.
81
37
*
1
0
0.
00
08
4E
-0
4
0.
02
27
0.
13
65
0.
00
01
0.
06
03
0
E
N
T
R
Y
C
A
SH
0.
43
46
*
0.
10
57
0.
12
1
0.
13
13
0.
06
9
0.
09
8
0.
15
08
0.
52
87
*
0.
69
68
*
1
0.
00
01
0.
36
35
0.
29
9
0.
25
82
0.
55
36
0.
39
95
0.
19
35
0
0
E
N
T
R
Y
SA
F
E
A
SS
E
T
S
-0
.1
64
0*
0.
64
98
*
0.
14
13
*
0.
10
93
-0
.0
28
2
0.
18
82
*
-0
.0
07
5
0.
36
91
*
0.
21
98
*
0.
19
03
*
1
0.
04
42
0
0.
08
4
0.
18
15
0.
73
1
0.
02
06
0.
92
7
0
0.
00
67
0.
09
96
E
N
T
R
Y
B
O
N
D
-0
.1
21
0.
14
17
*
0.
90
10
*
-0
.0
28
8
-0
.0
30
2
0.
04
82
0.
01
67
0.
31
71
*
0.
20
38
*
0.
14
09
0.
28
33
*
1
0.
13
01
0.
07
66
0
0.
72
05
0.
70
71
0.
54
92
0.
83
58
0.
00
01
0.
01
05
0.
22
49
0.
00
05
E
N
T
R
Y
R
E
T
IR
E
M
E
N
T
B
E
N
E
F
IT
S
-0
.1
35
0.
05
36
0.
23
80
*
0.
51
84
*
-0
.0
42
2
0.
07
33
0.
13
3
0.
34
78
*
0.
24
93
*
0.
28
40
*
0.
20
11
*
0.
24
53
*
1
0.
10
89
0.
52
61
0.
00
4
0
0.
61
76
0.
38
6
0.
11
47
0
0.
00
28
0.
01
29
0.
01
98
0.
00
35
E
N
T
R
Y
LI
F
E
IN
SU
R
A
N
C
E
-0
.0
88
0.
04
3
0.
05
3
-0
.0
64
2
0.
33
53
*
0.
15
53
*
0.
04
65
0.
20
96
*
0.
19
32
*
0.
11
07
0.
08
13
0.
14
00
*
0.
17
52
*
1
0.
28
75
0.
60
53
0.
52
8
0.
44
0
0.
06
04
0.
57
57
0.
01
08
0.
01
9
0.
34
44
0.
34
47
0.
09
19
0.
04
29
E
N
T
R
Y
R
IS
K
Y
A
SS
E
T
S
-0
.1
76
3*
0.
03
67
0.
35
46
*
0.
13
1
0.
00
72
0.
79
75
*
-0
.0
99
0.
52
67
*
0.
35
07
*
0.
14
09
0.
27
37
*
0.
21
14
*
0.
22
49
*
0.
17
33
*
1
0.
02
72
0.
64
78
0
0.
10
2
0.
92
84
0
0.
21
74
0
0
0.
22
49
0.
00
08
0.
00
85
0.
00
76
0.
03
64
N
o
FA
M
IL
Y
M
E
M
B
E
R
S
-0
.0
79
-0
.1
26
1
0.
07
9
0.
07
23
-0
.0
38
9
-0
.1
12
5
0.
14
48
*
-0
.1
30
9*
-0
.1
30
3*
-0
.2
05
0*
-0
.1
45
0*
0.
07
73
-0
.0
18
6
-0
.0
37
8
-0
.0
31
5
1
0.
31
57
0.
10
88
0.
31
4
0.
35
93
0.
62
17
0.
15
29
0.
06
51
0.
09
57
0.
09
74
0.
07
57
0.
07
57
0.
33
61
0.
82
61
0.
64
92
0.
69
54
%
F
E
M
A
LE
S
-0
.0
43
0.
11
88
0.
04
4
-0
.0
49
2
-0
.0
50
1
-0
.0
36
3
-0
.1
28
6
-0
.0
89
8
-0
.1
32
2*
-0
.2
29
1*
0.
03
16
0.
01
04
-0
.1
22
2
0.
03
02
0.
01
62
0.
02
37
1
0.
58
34
0.
13
08
0.
57
9
0.
53
28
0.
52
55
0.
64
57
0.
10
19
0.
25
41
0.
09
24
0.
04
65
0.
69
97
0.
89
7
0.
14
74
0.
71
68
0.
83
99
0.
76
37
N
o
C
H
IL
D
R
E
N
-0
.1
-0
.1
22
5
0.
09
0.
05
45
-0
.0
37
3
-0
.0
85
2
0.
07
05
-0
.1
39
5*
-0
.1
51
0*
-0
.2
44
2*
-0
.1
16
5
0.
08
85
-0
.0
07
5
-0
.0
55
4
-0
.0
02
2
0.
95
25
*
0.
04
12
1
0.
20
37
0.
11
93
0.
25
2
0.
48
97
0.
63
63
0.
27
98
0.
37
1
0.
07
57
0.
05
44
0.
03
35
0.
15
42
0.
27
04
0.
92
98
0.
50
55
0.
97
81
0
0.
60
12
A
G
E
H
E
A
D
O
F
H
O
U
SE
-
H
O
LD
-0
.0
87
-0
.0
06
9
-0
.0
05
0.
09
26
-0
.0
33
-0
.0
69
8
0.
10
15
-0
.0
2
-0
.0
74
0.
05
15
-0
.0
62
-0
.0
15
9
0.
03
85
0.
03
29
-0
.0
87
3
0.
16
84
*
-0
.1
69
8*
0.
08
96
1
0.
26
96
0.
93
0.
94
8
0.
23
96
0.
67
54
0.
37
6
0.
19
75
0.
80
04
0.
34
8
0.
65
89
0.
44
92
0.
84
35
0.
64
92
0.
69
21
0.
27
7
0.
03
17
0.
03
02
0.
25
54
F
E
M
A
LE
H
E
A
D
O
F
H
O
U
SE
-
H
O
LD
-0
.1
-0
.0
81
9
0.
19
43
*
0.
04
61
-0
.0
54
2
0.
18
66
*
-0
.1
82
5*
0.
10
5
-0
.0
38
2
-0
.1
84
5
-0
.0
37
6
0.
10
26
0.
09
9
0.
01
02
0.
18
54
*
-0
.0
84
1
0.
13
16
*
-0
.0
77
8
-0
.0
06
9
1
0.
20
48
0.
29
86
0.
01
3
0.
55
88
0.
49
19
0.
01
71
0.
01
97
0.
18
22
0.
62
83
0.
11
06
0.
64
63
0.
20
11
0.
24
13
0.
90
22
0.
02
01
0.
28
6
0.
09
39
0.
32
33
0.
93
01
B
O
R
N
IN
N
O
R
T
H
E
R
N
IT
A
LY
0.
11
12
0.
08
03
0.
03
9
0.
04
35
0.
19
90
*
0.
00
23
-0
.0
68
4
0.
19
33
*
0.
12
1
0.
15
36
0.
03
62
0.
05
43
0.
13
79
0.
02
04
0.
02
66
-0
.0
64
3
-0
.0
31
6
-0
.0
25
6
-0
.0
02
6
0.
04
87
1
0.
15
76
0.
30
84
0.
62
4
0.
58
11
0.
01
09
0.
97
63
0.
38
58
0.
01
34
0.
12
4
0.
18
53
0.
65
91
0.
49
94
0.
10
18
0.
80
66
0.
74
08
0.
41
47
0.
68
92
0.
74
55
0.
97
37
0.
53
68
FO
R
E
IG
N
C
O
U
P
LE
-0
.0
73
-0
.0
83
5
-0
.1
22
-0
.0
16
-0
.0
71
8
-0
.1
16
5
-0
.0
99
1
-0
.3
56
4*
-0
.3
29
9*
-0
.2
07
0*
-0
.0
99
8
-0
.1
15
7
-0
.1
59
5*
-0
.1
52
2*
-0
.1
47
0*
0.
26
12
*
0.
13
59
*
0.
26
33
*
0.
10
83
-0
.1
19
1
0.
04
09
1
0.
35
44
0.
28
95
0.
12
2
0.
83
9
0.
36
26
0.
13
86
0.
20
8
0
0
0.
07
28
0.
22
29
0.
14
9
0.
05
79
0.
06
57
0.
06
61
0.
00
08
0.
08
36
0.
00
07
0.
16
86
0.
12
99
0.
60
38
H
IG
H
E
ST
E
D
U
C
A
T
IO
N
0.
22
19
*
0.
09
39
0.
05
3
0.
17
20
*
0.
06
98
0.
24
83
*
0.
04
25
0.
51
67
*
0.
56
26
*
0.
48
80
*
0.
19
61
*
0.
02
4
0.
25
20
*
0.
16
47
*
0.
24
76
*
-0
.2
48
5*
-0
.1
06
6
-0
.2
42
6*
-0
.1
03
1
-0
.0
16
6
0.
11
9
-0
.3
09
0*
1
0.
00
44
0.
23
31
0.
50
4
0.
02
82
0.
37
63
0.
00
14
0.
58
97
0
0
0
0.
01
58
0.
76
58
0.
00
25
0.
04
62
0.
00
18
0.
00
14
0.
17
57
0.
00
18
0.
19
02
0.
83
38
0.
13
02
0.
00
01
F
IN
A
N
C
IA
L
E
D
U
C
A
T
IO
N
0.
24
28
*
0.
11
8
0.
20
13
*
0.
07
02
0.
09
36
0.
16
26
*
0.
01
27
0.
54
00
*
0.
48
43
*
0.
39
39
*
0.
08
5
0.
12
88
0.
34
06
*
0.
24
35
*
0.
22
44
*
-0
.1
82
6*
-0
.0
30
7
-0
.1
48
0*
-0
.0
14
6
0.
01
74
0.
20
95
*
-0
.4
08
5*
0.
55
44
*
1
0.
00
18
0.
13
36
0.
01
0.
37
35
0.
23
45
0.
03
82
0.
87
17
0
0
0.
00
04
0.
29
94
0.
10
79
0
0.
00
3
0.
00
47
0.
01
97
0.
69
68
0.
05
94
0.
85
33
0.
82
59
0.
00
73
0
0
N
E
T
IN
C
O
M
E
0.
22
61
*
0.
14
20
*
0.
14
22
*
0.
16
76
*
0.
03
13
0.
19
36
*
0.
19
39
*
0.
62
54
*
0.
59
76
*
0.
59
33
*
0.
22
94
*
0.
12
68
0.
37
16
*
0.
24
67
*
0.
24
37
*
-0
.0
57
4
-0
.2
21
0*
-0
.1
20
7
0.
09
47
-0
.1
16
7
0.
09
87
-0
.3
61
0*
0.
63
94
*
0.
56
74
*
1
0.
00
37
0.
07
07
0.
07
0.
03
25
0.
69
18
0.
01
33
0.
01
31
0
0
0
0.
00
46
0.
11
37
0
0.
00
26
0.
00
21
0.
46
64
0.
00
46
0.
12
49
0.
22
91
0.
13
78
0.
21
03
0
0
0
%
IN
C
O
M
E
E
A
R
N
E
R
S
0.
08
51
0.
12
59
-0
.0
1
0.
02
6
0.
10
38
0.
18
30
*
-0
.0
68
9
0.
34
54
*
0.
32
96
*
0.
45
06
*
0.
22
31
*
0.
00
1
0.
14
71
*
0.
17
80
*
0.
16
35
*
-0
.7
01
8*
-0
.1
35
0*
-0
.6
90
5*
-0
.0
47
0.
03
42
0.
10
94
-0
.2
91
7*
0.
50
98
*
0.
29
48
*
0.
44
31
*
1
0.
27
98
0.
10
93
0.
90
4
0.
74
21
0.
18
73
0.
01
94
0.
38
23
0
0
0
0.
00
59
0.
99
02
0.
08
06
0.
03
1
0.
04
08
0
0.
08
58
0
0.
55
15
0.
66
43
0.
16
46
0.
00
02
0
0.
00
01
0
E
M
P
LO
Y
E
D
H
E
A
D
O
F
H
O
U
SE
H
O
LD
0.
23
03
*
0.
07
44
0.
07
7
0.
06
8
0.
04
53
0.
07
35
0.
23
81
*
0.
31
17
*
0.
44
86
*
0.
36
34
*
0.
09
39
0.
07
28
0.
13
58
0.
05
16
0.
09
25
-0
.0
38
4
-0
.0
31
1
-0
.0
31
1
-0
.2
37
6*
-0
.1
11
1
0.
08
53
-0
.0
78
6
0.
32
66
*
0.
27
96
*
0.
38
04
*
0.
17
24
*
1
0.
00
31
0.
34
52
0.
33
0.
38
85
0.
56
6
0.
35
11
0.
00
22
0.
00
01
0
0.
00
13
0.
25
13
0.
36
51
0.
10
72
0.
53
46
0.
24
94
0.
62
69
0.
69
32
0.
69
4
0.
00
23
0.
15
81
0.
27
89
0.
31
89
0
0.
00
03
0
0.
02
77
F
IN
A
N
C
IA
L
R
IS
K
0.
05
06
0.
00
33
0.
13
32
*
-0
.0
05
5
-0
.0
83
4
0.
01
18
0.
10
15
0.
17
02
*
0.
19
18
*
0.
18
55
0.
07
55
0.
08
86
0.
15
76
*
0.
08
85
0.
08
28
-0
.1
53
6*
-0
.1
56
4*
-0
.1
58
9*
0.
02
76
-0
.0
73
6
-0
.0
61
4
-0
.1
36
7*
0.
12
91
0.
14
77
*
0.
18
57
*
0.
07
05
0.
00
24
1
0.
52
13
0.
96
67
0.
09
0.
94
47
0.
28
97
0.
88
07
0.
19
74
0.
02
98
0.
01
42
0.
10
87
0.
35
68
0.
26
97
0.
06
11
0.
28
65
0.
30
26
0.
05
03
0.
04
61
0.
04
28
0.
72
63
0.
35
07
0.
43
62
0.
08
18
0.
10
04
0.
05
98
0.
01
76
0.
37
14
0.
97
58
PA
R
E
N
T
S
A
LI
V
E
0.
09
86
0.
08
67
-0
.0
31
0.
01
8
0.
05
28
-0
.0
88
9
-0
.0
21
4
0.
06
5
0.
06
63
0.
12
53
0.
11
81
0.
08
02
0.
08
15
0.
01
25
-0
.0
44
8
0.
09
18
0.
09
17
0.
08
63
-0
.0
84
-0
.0
08
9
0.
13
67
*
-0
.1
11
1
0.
05
88
0.
15
50
*
0.
03
65
0.
00
66
-0
.0
03
8
-0
.1
94
8*
1
0.
21
05
0.
27
09
0.
69
9
0.
81
92
0.
50
34
0.
25
91
0.
78
58
0.
41
0.
40
05
0.
28
08
0.
14
87
0.
31
83
0.
33
47
0.
88
05
0.
57
73
0.
24
4
0.
24
45
0.
27
36
0.
28
65
0.
91
05
0.
08
19
0.
15
81
0.
45
57
0.
04
82
0.
64
33
0.
93
33
0.
96
18
0.
01
27
T
he
ta
bl
e
re
po
rt
s
co
rr
el
at
io
ns
fo
r
th
e
re
gr
es
so
rs
us
ed
th
e
an
al
ys
is
.
*
in
di
ca
te
s
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
at
10
pe
r
ce
nt
le
ve
l.
D
efi
ni
ti
on
s
of
th
e
va
ri
ab
le
s
ar
e
pr
ov
id
ed
in
A
pp
en
di
x
1.
44
References
Aiyagari, R. (1994). Uninsured idiosyncratic risk and aggregate saving. Quarterly Journal
of Economics 109, 659–684.
Andersen, S., H. T. and K. Nielsen (2019). Once bitten, twice shy: The power of personal
experiences in risk taking. Journal of financial economics , Article in press.
Arnaboldi, F., B. Casu, E. Kalotychou, and A. Sarkisyan (2018). The performance effects of
board heterogeneity: what works for eu banks? The European Journal of Finance, 1–28.
Bacha, S. and M. Azouzi (2019). How gender and emotions bias the credit decision-making
in banking firms. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance 22, 183–191.
Baker, L. (1996). Differences in earnings between male and female physicians. New England
Journal of Medicine 334, 960–964.
Bank of Italy (2018). Indagine sui bilanci delle famiglie italiane. Statistiche.
Barasinska, N., D. Schaefer, and A. Stephan (2012). Individual risk attitudes and the com-
position of financial portfolios: Evidence from german household portfolios. The Quarterly
Review of Economics and Finance 52, 1–14.
Barber, B. M., A. Scherbina, and B. Schlusche (2017). Performance isn’t everything: Per-
sonal characteristics and career outcomes of mutual fund managers. Working Paper .
Behrman, J. R., R. A. Pollak, and P. Taubman (1982). Parental preferences and provision
for progeny. Journal of Political Economy 90, 52–73.
Behrman, J. R. and P. Taubman (1986). Birth order, schooling, and earnings. Journal of
Labor Economics 4, 121–150.
Benzoni, L., P. Collin-Dufresne, and R. Goldstein (2007). Portfolio choice over the lifecycle
when the stock and labor markets are cointegrated. The Journal of Finance 62, 2123–2167.
Bertaut, C. and M. Starr-McCluer (2002). Household portfolios in the united states. In
L. Guiso, M. Haliassos, and T. Jappelli (Eds.), Household Portfolio, pp. 181–218. MIT
Press, Cambridge, MA.
Bertrand, M. and K. F. Hallock (2001). The gender gap in top corporate jobs. Industrial
and Labor Relations Review 55 (1), 3–21.
Bertrand, M. and S. Mullainathan (2003). Enjoying the quiet life? corporate governance
and managerial preferences. Journal of Political Economy 111 (5), 1043–1075.
Black, S. E., P. J. Devereux, and K. Salvanes (2005). The more the merrier? the effect of fam-
ily size and birth order on childrenâĂŹs education. Quarterly Journal of Economics 120,
669–700.
45
Black, S. E., P. J. Devereux, and K. Salvanes (2010). Small family, smart family? family
size and the iq scores of young men. Journal of Human Resources 45, 33–58.
Bodie, Z., R. Merton, and W. Samuelson (1992). Labor supply flexibility and portfolio choice
in a life cycle model. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 16, 427–449.
Booth, A. and H. Kee (2009). Birth order matters: the effect of family size and birth order
on educational attainment. Journal of Population Economics 22, 367–397.
Brickley, J., C. Smith, J. Zimmerman, and J. Willett (2009). Using organizational architec-
ture to lead change. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 3, 59–66.
Brown, D., S. Cederburg, and M. O’Doherty (2017). Tax uncertainty and retirement savings
diversification. Journal of Financial Economics 126, 689–712.
Browning, M. (2000). The saving behaviour of a two-person household. Scandinavian Journal
of Economics 102 (2), 235–251.
Brunnermeier, M. K. and S. Nagel (2008). Do wealth fluctuations generate time-varying risk
aversion? micro-evidence on individuals. American Economic Review 98 (3), 713–36.
Calvet, L. E., J. Y. Campbell, and P. Sodini (2007). Down or out: Assessing the welfare
costs of household investment mistakes. Journal of Political Economy 115, 707–747.
Campbell, J. Y., a. V. L. M. (2001). Who should buy long-term bonds? American Economic
Review 91, 99–127.
Carroll, C. (2002). Portfolio of the rich. In L. Guiso, M. Haliassos, and T. Jappelli (Eds.),
Household Portfolios, pp. 389–430. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Caskey, J. (1997). Beyond cash-and-carry: Financial savings, financial services, and low-
income households in two communities. Washington, DC: Consumer Federation of Amer-
ica.
Cohen, L. (2009). Loyalty-based portfolio choice. Review of Financial Studies 23, 1213–1245.
Condry, S., J. C. McConnell, C. Jr., and L. W. Pogatshnik (1983). Sex differences: A study
of the ear of the beholder. Sex Roles 9 (6), 697–704.
Conley, D. and R. Glauber (2006). Parental educational investment and childrenâĂŹs aca-
demic risk: Estimates of the impact of sibship size and birth order from exogenous variation
in fertility. Journal of Human Resources 41, 722–737.
COVIP (2019). Informazioni sul trattamento fiscale della previdenza complementare.
https://www.covip.it/?cat=321#. accessed on 2019-09-04.
Cronqvist, H. and F. Yu (2017). Shaped by their daughters: Executives, female socialization,
and corporate social responsibility. Journal of Financial Economics 126, 543–562.
46
Croson, R. and U. Gneezy (2009). Gender differences in preferences. Journal of Economic
Literature 47, 1–27.
Dahl, G. and E. Moretti (2008). The demand for sons. Review of Economic Studies 75 (4),
1085–1120.
De Haan, M. (2010). Birth order, family size and educational attainment. Economics of
Education Review 29, 577–588.
Dimmock, S. G., R. Kouwenberg, O. Mitchell, and K. Peijnenburg (2016). Ambiguity aver-
sion and household portfolio choice puzzles: Empirical evidence. Journal of Financial
Economics 119, 559–577.
Eagly, A. (1995). The science and politics of comparing women and men. American Psy-
chology 50, 145–158.
Fagereng, A., C. Gottlieb, and L. Guiso (2017). Asset market participation and portfolio
choice over the life-cycle. The Journal of Finance 77, 705–750.
Fauver, L., M. Hung, X. Li, and A. G. Taboada (2017). Board reforms and firm value:
Worldwide evidence. Journal of Financial Economics 125 (1), 120–142.
Gander, J. P. (1997). Gender-based faculty-pay differences in academe: A reduced-form
approach. Journal of Labor Research 18 (3), 451–461.
Garcia, J. L., J. J. Heckmanb, and A. L. Ziff (2018). Gender differences in the benefits of
an influential early childhood program. European Economic Review 109, 9–22.
Glynn, A. N. and M. Sen (2015). Identifying judicial empathy: Does having daughters cause
judges to rule for women’s issues? American Journal of Political Science 59 (1), 37–54.
Goldin, C. and C. Rouse (2000). Orchestrating impartiality: The impact of ’blind’ auditions
on female musicians. American Economic Review 90 (4), 715–741.
Gollier, C. (2002). What does theory have to say about household portfolios? In L. Guiso,
M. Haliassos, and T. Jappelli (Eds.), Household Portfolios, pp. 27–54. MIT Press, Cam-
bridge, MA.
Gomes, F., L. Kotlikoff, and L. Viceira (2008). Optimal life-cycle investing with flexible labor
supply: A welfare analysis of life-cycle funds. American Economic Review 98, 297–303.
Gompers, P. A. and S. Q. Wang (2017a). And the children shall lead: Gender diversity and
performance in venture capital. NBER Working Paper No. 23454 .
Gompers, P. A. and S. Q. Wang (2017b). Diversity in innovation. NBER Working Paper
No. 23082 .
Gormley, T., H. Liu, and G. Zhou (2010). Limited participation and consumption-saving puz-
zles: A simple explanation and the role of insurance. Journal of Financial Economics 96,
331–344.
47
Guiso, L., M. Haliassos, and T. Jappelli (2002). Introduction. In L. Guiso, M. Haliassos,
and T. Jappelli (Eds.), Household Portfolio, pp. 1–24. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Guiso, L. and M. Paiella (2008). Risk aversion, wealth, and background risk. Journal of the
European Economic Association 6 (6), 1109–1150.
Guiso, L. and P. Sodini (2012). Household finance: An emerging field. In G. M. Con-
stantinides, M. Harris, and R. M. Stulz (Eds.), Handbook of the Economics of Finance,
Volume 2, pp. 1397–1532. Elsevier.
Haliassos, M. and C. Bertaut (1995). Why do so few hold stocks? The Economic Journal 105,
1110–1129.
Haliassos, M. and C. Hassapis (2002). Borrowing constraints, portfolio choice, and precau-
tionary. In E. Kontoghiorghes, B. Rustem, and S. Siokos (Eds.), Computational Methods in
Decision-Making, Economics and Finance. Applied Optimization, Volume 74, pp. 185–212.
Springer, Boston, MA.
Haliassos, M. and A. Michaelides (2003). Portfolio choice and liquidity constraints. Inter-
national Economic Review 44, 143–177.
Hanushek, E. A. (1992). The trade-off between child quantity and quality. Journal of Political
Economy 100, 84–117.
Hotz, V. J. and J. Pantano (2015). Strategic parenting, birth order and school performance.
Journal of Population Economics 28, 911–936.
Iezzi, S. (2008). Investors’ risk attitude and risky behavior: a bayesian approach with imper-
fect information. Temi di discussione Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International
Relations Area 692.
Imbens, G. W. and J. M. Wooldridge (2009). Recent developments in the econometrics of
program evaluation. Journal of economic literature 47 (1), 5–86.
IOSCO and OECD (2018). The application of behavioural insights to financial literacy and
investor education programmes and initiatives. Report of the IOSCO Committee 8 on
Retail Investors .
ISTAT (2013). Dataset on daily life and citizen opinions. available at http://dati.istat.it .
ISTAT (2017). Dataset on population and households. available at http://dati.istat.it .
IVASS (2018). Relazione sull’attivita’ svolta dall’istituto nell’anno 2017.
Jianakoplos, N. A. and A. Bernasek (2007). Are women more risk averse? Economic
Inquiry 36, 620–630.
Jin, F. (2011). Revisiting the composition puzzles of the household portfolio: New evidence.
Review of Financial Economics 20, 63–73.
48
Kacperczyka, M., J. Nosal, and L. Stevens (2018). Investor sophistica-
tion and capital income inequality. Journal of Monetary Economics ,
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmoneco.2018.11.002.
Kantarevic, J. and S. Mechoulan (2006). Birth order, educational attainment, and earnings:
An investigation using the psid. Journal of Human Resources 41, 755–777.
Kaul, T. (2018). Intra household allocation of educational expenses: Gender discrimination
and investing in the future. World Development 104, 336–343.
Kelly, M. (1995). All their eggs in one basket: Portfolio diversification of u.s. households.
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 27, 87–96.
Keloharju, M., S. Knupfer, and J. Linnainmaa (2012). Do investors buy what they know?
product market choices and investment decisions. The Review of Financial Studies 25,
2921–2958.
King, M. and J. Leape (1987). Asset accumulation, information and the life cycle. NBER
Working Paper 2392.
King, M. and J. Leape (1998). Wealth and portfolio composition: Theory and evidence.
Journal of Public Economics 69, 155–193.
Krusell, P. and A. A. . Smith (1998). Income and wealth heterogeneity in the macroeconomy.
Journal of Political Economy 106, 867–896.
Kuhnen, C. M. and A. C. Miu (2017). Socioeconomic status and learning from financial
information. Journal of Financial Economics 124, 349–372.
Li, N. and A. S. Wahid (2018). Director tenure diversity and board monitoring effectiveness.
Contemporary Accounting Research 35 (3), 1363–1394.
Malmendier, U. and S. Nagel (2011). Depression babies: do macroeconomic experiences
affect risk taking? The Quarterly Journal of Economics 126 (1), 373–416.
Markowitz, H. (1952). Portfolio selection. The Journal of Finance 7 (1), 77–91.
Menchik, P. and N. Jianakoplos (1997). Black-white wealth inequality: Is inheritance the
reason? Economic Inquiry 35, 428–442.
Merry, E. and L. Thomas (2014). Asset holdings of young households: Trends and patterns.
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review 96, 391–411.
Monfardini, C. and S. G. See (2010). Birth order and child outcomes: Does maternal quality
time matter? IZA Discussion Paper Series DP6825.
Morgan, L. (1998). Glass-ceiling effect or cohort effect? a longitudinal study of the gender
earnings gap for engineers, 1982 to 1989. American Sociological Review 63 (4), 479–493.
49
Niessen-Ruenzi, A. and S. Ruenzi (2018). Sex matters: Gender bias in the mutual fund
industry. Management Science.
Nikiforidis, L., K. Durante, J. Redden, and V. Griskevicius (2018). Do mothers spend more
on daughters while fathers spend more on sons? Journal of Consumer Psychology 28 (1),
149–156.
OECD (2017). G20/oecd infe report on adult financial literacy in g20 countries.
Oliveira, J. (2019). Birth order and the gender gap in educational attainment. Review of
Economics of the Household 17, 775–803.
Price, C. (2012). Gender, competition, and managerial decisions. Management Science 58,
114–122.
Price, J. (2008). Parent-child quality time: does birth order matter? Journal of Human
Resources 43, 240–265.
Raley, S. and S. Bianchi (2006). Sons, daughters, and family processes: Does gender of
children matter? Annual Review of Sociology 32, 401–421.
Rosen, H. S. and S. Wu (2004). Portfolio choice and health status. Journal of Financial
Economics 72 (3), 457–484.
Rosenzweig, M. R. and T. P. Schultz (1982). Market opportunities, genetic endowments,
and intrafamily resource distribution: child survival in rural india. American Economic
Review 72 (4), 803–815.
Schubert, R., M. Brown, M. Gysler, and H. Brachinger (1999). Financial decision-making:
Are women really more risk-averse? American Economic Review 89, 381–385.
Sidorowicz, L. S. and L. G. Sparks (1980). Baby x revisited. Sex Roles 6 (1), 67–73.
Viceira, L. (2001). Optimal portfolio choice for long-horizon investors with nontradable labor
income. The Journal of Finance 56, 433–470.
Washington, E. L. (2008). Female socialization: how daughters affect their legislator fathers’
voting on women’s issues. The American economic review 98 (1), 311–332.
Wood, R. G., M. E. Corcoran, and P. N. Courant (1993). Pay differences among the
highly paid: The male-female earnings gap in lawyers’ salaries. Journal of Labor Eco-
nomics 11 (3), 417–441.
50
 CEFIN – Centro Studi di Banca e Finanza www.cefin.unimore.it 
Dipartimento di Economia Marco Biagi – Università di Modena e Reggio Emilia 
Viale Jacopo Berengario 51, 41121 MODENA (Italy)   
tel. 39-059.2056711 (Centralino)  fax 39-059 205 6927 
 
CEFIN Working Papers ISSN (online) 2282-8168 
 
77 Behind the success of dominated personal pension plans: sales force and financial literacy factors, by 
Marotta, G. (October 2019). 
76 Short-term household income mobility before and after the Great Recession: A four country study, by 
Casabianca, E.J. and Giarda, E. (June 2019). 
75 The impact of Fundamental Review of Trading Book: A preliminary assessment on a stylized 
portfolio, by Pederzoli, C. and Torricelli, C. (February 2019). 
74 Security-voting structure and equity financing in the Banking Sector: ‘One Head-One Vote’ versus 
‘One Share-One Vote’, by Ferretti, R., Pattitoni, P. and Castelli, A. (January 2019). 
73 The Financial Decisions of Immigrant and Native Households: Evidence from Italy, by Bertocchi, G., 
Brunetti, M. and Zaiceva, A. (January 2019). 
72 Why choosing dominated personal pension plans: sales force and financial literacy effects, by Marotta, 
G. (July 2018). 
71 Spending Policies of Italian Banking Foundations, by Pattarin, F. (July, 2018).  
70 The Forecasting Performance of Dynamic Factors Models with Vintage Data, by Di Bonaventura, L., 
Forni, M. and Pattarin, F. (July 2018).  
69 Housing Market Shocks in Italy: a GVAR Approach, by Cipollini, A. and Parla, F. (April, 2018).  
68 Customer Complaining and Probability of Default in Consumer Credit, by Cosma, S., 
Pancotto, F. and  Vezzani, P. (March, 2018).  
67 Is Equity Crowdfunding a Good Tool for Social Enterprises?, by Cosma, S., Grasso, A.G.,  
Pagliacci, F. and Pedrazzoli, A. (February, 2018).  
66 Household Preferences for Socially Responsible Investments, 
by Rossi. M.C., Sansone, D., Torricelli, C. and van Soest, A. (February2018).  
65 Market-Book Ratios of European Banks: What does Explain the Structural Fall?, by Ferretti, R.,Gallo, 
G., Landi, A. and Venturelli. V. (January 2018).  
64 Past Income Scarcity and Current Perception of Financial Fragility, by Baldini, M., Gallo, G. and 
Torricelli, C. (December 2017).  
63 How does Financial Market Evaluate Business Models? Evidence from European Banks, 
by Cosma, S., Ferretti, R.,Gualandri, E., Landi, A. and Venturelli, V. (May 2017)  
62 Individual Heterogeneity and Pension Choices.  How to Communicate an Effective Message?,  
by Gallo, G., Torricelli, C. and van Soest, A. (April 2017)  
61 The Risk-Asymmetry Index, by Elyasiani, E., Gambarelli L. and Muzzioli, S.(December 2016)  
60 Strumenti per il sostegno finanziario di famiglie e microimprese: il caso italiano (Policies to 
help financially vulnerable Italian households and micro-businesses), by Cotterli, S. (December 2016)  
59 A test of the Behavioral versus the Rational model of Persuasion in Financial Advertising, 
by Ferretti, R., Pancotto, F. and Rubaltelli, E. (May 2016)  
58 Financial connectedness among European volatility risk premia, 
by Cipollini, A., Lo Cascio, I. and Muzzioli, S. (December 2015)  
57 The effectiveness of insider trading regulations. The case of the Italian tender offers, 
by Ferretti, R., Pattitoni, P. and Salinas, A. (September 2015)  
56 Introducing Aggregate Return on Investment as a Solution for the Contradiction between 
some PME Metrics and IRR, by Altshuler D. and Magni, C.A. (September 2015)  
55 ‘It’s a trap!’ The degree of poverty persistence in Italy and Europe, by Giarda, E. and  
Moroni, G. (September 2015)  
54 Systemic risk measures and macroprudential stress tests. An assessment over the 2014 
EBA exercise. by Pederzoli, C. and Torricelli,C.  (July 2015)  
53 Emotional intelligence and risk taking in investment decision-making, by Rubaltelli, E., 
Agnoli, S., Rancan, M.and Pozzoli, T. (July 2015)  
52 Second homes: households’ life dream or wrong investment?, by Brunetti, M. and 
 CEFIN – Centro Studi di Banca e Finanza www.cefin.unimore.it 
Dipartimento di Economia Marco Biagi – Università di Modena e Reggio Emilia 
Viale Jacopo Berengario 51, 41121 MODENA (Italy)   
tel. 39-059.2056711 (Centralino)  fax 39-059 205 6927 
 
Torricelli, C. (May  2015)  
51 Pseudo-naïve approaches to investment performance measurement, by Magni, C.A.  
(February, 2015)  
50 Monitoring systemic risk. A survey of the available macroprudential Toolkit, by  
Gualandri, E. and Noera, M. (November 2014).  
49 Towards a macroprudential policy in the EU: Main issues, by Gualandri, E. and 
 Noera, M. (November 2014).  
48 Does homeownership partly explain low participation in supplementary pension  
schemes?, by Santantonio, M., Torricelli, C., and Urzì Brancati M.C.,  (September 2014)  
47 An average-based accounting approach to capital asset investments: The case of 
project finance, by Magni, C.A. (September 2014) 
 
46 Should football coaches wear a suit? The impact of skill and management structure 
on Serie A Clubs’ performance, by Torricelli, C., Urzì Brancati M.C., and Mirtoleni, L. 
(July 2014) 
 
45 Family ties: occupational responses to cope with a household income shock, by 
Baldini, M., Torricelli, C., Urzì Brancati M.C. (April 2014) 
 
44 Volatility co-movements: a time scale decomposition analysis, by Cipollini, I., Lo 
Cascio I., Muzzioli. S. (November 2013) 
 
43 The effect of revenue and geographic diversification on bank performance, by Brighi, 
P., Venturelli, V. (October 2013)  
 
42 The sovereign debt crisis: the impact on the intermediation model of Italian banks,  
by Cosma,S., Gualandri, E. (October 2013)  
 
 
41 The financing of Italian firms and the credit crunch: findings and exit strategies,  
by Gualandri, E., Venturelli, V. (October 2013)  
40 Efficiency and unbiasedness of corn futures markets: New evidence across the 
financial crisis, by Pederzoli, C., Torricelli, C. (October 2013)  
39 La regolamentazione dello short selling: effetti sul mercato azionario italiano (Short 
selling ban: effects on the Italian stock market), by Mattioli L., Ferretti R. (August 
2013) 
38 A liquidity risk index as a regulatory tool for systematically important banks? An 
empirical assessment across two financial crises, by Gianfelice G., Marotta G., 
Torricelli C. (July 2013) 
37 Per un accesso sostenibile delle Pmi al credito (A sustainable access to credit for 
SMEs), by Marotta, G. (May 2013) 
36 The unavoidable persistence of forum shopping in the Insolvency Regulation, by  
Mucciarelli, F.M. (April 2013) 
35 Rating Triggers, Market Risk and the Need for More Regulation, by Parmeggiani, F. 
(December 2012) 
34 Collateral Requirements of SMEs: The Evidence from Less–Developed Countries,  
by Hanedar, E.H.  Broccardo, E. and Bazzana, F. (November 2012) 
33 Is it money or brains? The determinants of intra-family decision power, by Bertocchi, 
G., Brunetti, M. and Torricelli, C. (June 2012) 
32 Is financial fragility a matter of illiquidity? An appraisal for Italian households, by 
Brunetti, M, Giarda, E. and Torricelli, C. (June 2012) 
31 Attitudes, personality factors and household debt decisions: A study of consumer 
credit, by Stefano Cosma and Francesco Pattarin (February 2012) 
30 Corridor implied volatility and the variance risk premium in the Italian market,  
by Silvia Muzzioli (November 2011) 
29 Internal Corporate Governance and the Financial Crisis: Lessons for Banks,  
 CEFIN – Centro Studi di Banca e Finanza www.cefin.unimore.it 
Dipartimento di Economia Marco Biagi – Università di Modena e Reggio Emilia 
Viale Jacopo Berengario 51, 41121 MODENA (Italy)   
tel. 39-059.2056711 (Centralino)  fax 39-059 205 6927 
 
Regulators and Supervisors, by Gualandri, E., Stanziale, A. and Mangone, E. 
(November 2011) 
28 Are  defined contribution pension schemes socially sustainable? A conceptual  
map from a macroprudential perspective, by Marotta, G. (October 2011) 
27 Basel 3, Pillar 2: the role of banks’ internal governance and control function, by  
Gualandri, E. (September 2011) 
26 Underpricing, wealth loss for pre-existing shareholders and the cost of going 
public: the role of private equity backing in Italian IPOs, by Ferretti, R.  and Meles, 
A. (April 2011) 
25 Modelling credit risk for innovative firms: the role of innovation measures, by 
Pederzoli C., Thoma G., Torricelli C. (March 2011) 
24 Market Reaction to Second-Hand News: Attention Grabbing or Information 
Dissemination?, by Cervellati E.M., Ferretti R., Pattitoni P. (January 2011) 
23 Towards a volatility index for the Italian stock market, by Muzzioli S. (September 
2010) 
22 A parsimonious default prediction model for Italian SMEs, by Pederzoli C., 
Torricelli C. (June 2010) 
21 Average Internal Rate of Return and investment decisions: a new perspective, by 
Magni C.A. (February 2010) 
20 The skew pattern of implied volatility in the DAX index options market, by Muzzioli 
S. (December 2009) 
19 Accounting and economic measures: An integrated theory of capital budgeting, 
by Magni C.A. (December 2009) 
18 Exclusions of US-holders in cross-border takeover bids and the principle of 
equality in tender offers, by Mucciarelli F. (May 2009).  
17 Models for household portfolios and life-cycle allocations in the presence of labour 
income and longevity risk, by Torricelli C. (March 2009)  
16 Differential evolution of combinatorial search for constrained index tracking, by 
Paterlini S, Krink T, Mittnik S. (March 2009)  
15 Optimization heuristics for determining internal rating grading scales, by Paterlini 
S, Lyraa M, Pahaa J, Winker P. (March 2009)  
14 The impact of bank concentration on financial distress: the case of the European 
banking system, by Fiordelisi F, Cipollini A. (February 2009)  
13 Financial crisis and new dimensions of liquidity risk: rethinking prudential 
regulation and supervision, by Landi A, Gualandri E, Venturelli V. (January 2009)  
12 Lending interest rate pass-through in the euro area: a data-driven tale, by Marotta 
G. (October 2008)  
11 Option based forecast of volatility: an empirical study in the Dax index options 
market, Muzzioli S. (May 2008)  
10 Lending interest rate pass-through in the euro area, by Marotta G. (March 2008) 
9 Indebtedness, macroeconomic conditions and banks’ losses: evidence from Italy, 
by Torricelli C, Castellani S, Pederzoli C. (January 2008)  
8 Is public information really public? The role of newspapers, Ferretti R, Pattarin F. 
(January 2008)  
 CEFIN – Centro Studi di Banca e Finanza www.cefin.unimore.it 
Dipartimento di Economia Marco Biagi – Università di Modena e Reggio Emilia 
Viale Jacopo Berengario 51, 41121 MODENA (Italy)   
tel. 39-059.2056711 (Centralino)  fax 39-059 205 6927 
 
7 Differential evolution of multi-objective portfolio optimization, by Paterlini S, Krink 
T. (January 2008) 
6 Assessing and measuring the equity gap and the equity, by Gualandri E, Venturelli 
V. (January 2008)  
5 Model risk e tecniche per il controllo dei market parameter, Torricelli C, Bonollo 
M, Morandi D, Pederzoli C. (October 2007) 
4 The relations between implied and realised volatility, are call options more 
informative than put options? Evidence from the Dax index options market, by 
Muzzioli S. (October 2007) 
3 The maximum LG-likelihood method: an application to extreme quantile 
estimation in finance, by Ferrari D., Paterlini S. (June 2007)  
2 Default risk: Poisson mixture and the business cycle, by Pederzoli C. (June 2007)  
1 Population ageing, household portfolios and financial asset returns: a survey of 
the literature, by Brunetti M. (May 2007)  
 
 
